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EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS OF THE 
HANDICAPPED: WOULD TITLE VII 
REMEDIES BE APPROPRIATE AND 
1£FFECTIVE? 
Cornelius J. Peck* 
Currently, the federal government so favors deregulation that a pro-
posal extending the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ("Title VII") 1 to the handicapped may appear to be fanciful. 
Indeed, a principal proponent of such legislation, Senator Harrison 
Williams, resigned from his position in the United States Senate a year 
ago, and an equally committed successor has not yet appeared. Never-
theless, a bill to add the handicapped to the classes protected by Title 
VII was recently introduced in Congress. 2 
In 1979 the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources held 
two days of hearings on a bilP that would have added the handicapped 
to the classes protected by Title VII. 4 A number of other bills pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment against the handicapped were 
also introduced before Congress at that time. 5 This growing concern 
for the problems of the handicapped is reflected by the recent designa-
tion of 1981 as the International Year of Disabled People. 6 The concern, 
however, is not entirely recent; a substantial body of legal literature 
• Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1944, LL.B., 1949, Harvard University. 
I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
2. H.R. 1200, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H289-90 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983). 
3. S. REP. No. 446, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). 
4. See generally Equal Employment Opportunity For The Handicapped Act OJ 1979, Hear-
ings on S. 446 before the Senate Comm. On Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979). 
5. See generally H.R. 373, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 442 (1979); H.R. 609, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 448 (1979); H.R. 1326, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. 
REC. 999 (1979); H.R. 3345, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 6849 (1979); H.R. 5510, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. 27558 (1979); H.R. 7423, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 126 
CONG. REC. H3963 (daily ed. May 21, 1980). 
Eleanor H. Norton, former Chairperson of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
stated in her testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor 
that she believed the addition of a prohibition against discrimination in employment against the 
handicapped would be an appropriate addition to Title VII. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 
82 (1979). 
6. G. A. Res. 34/154, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 178-79, U.N. Doc A/34/46 (1980); 
G.A. Res. 31/27, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 148 U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); Proclama-
tion No. 4818, 46 Fed. Reg. 11801 (1981). 
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evinces the long-standing and pervasive interest in legal solutions to 
the problems of the handicapped. 7 
In some respects, the protection currently offered to the employment 
interests of the handicapped can be considered substantial. For ~xample, 
existing federal law requires contractors employing persons to perform 
a contract in excess of $2,500 to take affirmative action to employ 
and advance handicapped persons in employment. 8 Affirmative action 
programs are also mandated for disabled veterans. 9 Moreover, a ma-
jority of the states now protect the handicapped from employment 
discrimination under various fair employment practices acts. 10 
There is, however, good reason for dissatisfaction with the eff ec-
tiveness of current laws. A Labor Department survey completed in 1979 
revealed that ninety percent of federal contractors were not complying 
7. See generally, tenBrock, The Right to Live in the World; The Disabled in the Law of 
Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966); Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal 
Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65 (1977); Achtenberg, Law and the Physically Disabled, 8 Sw. 
U.L. REV. 847 (1976); Symposium on the Rights of the Handicapped, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 941-1104 
(1977); Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunity For the Handicapped: 
An Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1978); Hammer, Rights 
of the Handicapped, in 1974 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 887 (1974); Task Panel, President's Com-
mission on Mental Health, Mental Health and Human Rights: Report of the Task Panel on 
Legal and Ethical Issues, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 (1978); Note, Rehabilitating the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 58 B.U.L. REv. 247 (1978); Note, Lowering the Barriers to Employment of the 
Handicapped: Affirmative Action Obligations Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 D1cK L. REv. 
174 (1976); Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Individuals, 49 So. 
CAL. L. REV. 785 (1976); Note, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 CornM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 457 (1974); Comment, Protecting the Handicapped from Employment 
Discrimination in the Private Sector: A Critical Analysis of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of /973, 54 TUL. L. REV. 717 (1980). 
8. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1975). Regulations issued by the Office 
of Federal Contract Compliance Programs extend the obligation to all operations and facilities 
of a government contractor, subject to a waiver where facilities have been found separate and 
distinct from activities related to performance of the contract, 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.3-4 (1982). 
An administrative law judge has concluded that the Department of Labor cannot require a waiver 
insofar as it Jacks jurisdiction in the first instance. 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U .S.C. § 794 (1975), prohibits discrimination 
against an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" under any program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance or conducted by any executive agency or the Postal Service. Id. Three 
courts of appeals have determined that the section does not apply to employment discrimination 
unless the primary objective of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment. Carmi 
v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); 
Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilita-
tion Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). More recently 
a court of appeals has decided that the prohibition against discrimination in employment is not 
so limited. Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
9. A special law respecting disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam era requires a party 
holding a contract for $10,000 or more to take similar action for the benefit of such veterans. 
Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974 § 402, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1978). See also Veterans Readjust-
ment Act of 1974, § 403, 38 U.S.C. § 2014 (1979) (promoting maximum employment and job 
opportunity in United States government employment for disabled veterans and veterans of the 
Vietnam era). 
10. See generally SA Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 451 (1980). 
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with the laws concerning the employment of the handicapped, largely 
because they lacked knowledge of the law's requirements. 11 In addition, 
mounting backlogs 12 and limited enforcement have hampered implemen-
tation of these laws. 13 This sluggish administrative performance has 
been made even less tolerable by the substantial number of decisions 
holding that there is no private right of action to enforce the law as 
applied to contractors. 14 Although constitutionally based claims have 
provided protection against handicap discrimination by government 
employers, 1 s the protection currently available to handicapped persons 
generally is not as broad or comprehensive as that provided classes 
protected by Title VII. Title VII permits enforcement by aggrieved in-
dividuals in privately instituted law suits against both public and private 
employers. Including the handicapped in the groups protected by Title 
VII would constitute a substantial expansion of regulation applicable 
to employer decisions concerning job applicants and employees. 
The appeal of the handicapped is so great and the humanistic tradi-
tions of our culture so deeply engrained that it is only with great 
reluctance that one questions whether use of Title VII to provide and 
expand job opportunities for the handicapped is really in the best interest 
of the handicapped and the interest of society. Yet, sympathy and com-
passion for the handicapped, regardless how admirable, must not lead 
us to adopt expensive but ineffective programs. It appears, for example, 
that eloquent and moving arguments concerning the human dignity 
of the handicapped and their "right" to participate as equals in society16 
11. Address by Weldon Rongeau, Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programs, reprinted in BNA NEWS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, Apr. 7, 1979. 
12. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1979) (testimony of Weldon Rongeau) (indicating 
that at the end of the second quarter of 1979 there was a backlog of 1,940 cases). 
13. In August, 1979, the Department of Labor had initiated only 23 administrative com-
plaints of handicap discrimination, of which only five had been settled. News and Background 
Information, IOI LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 296 (1979). 
14. The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that there 
is no private right of action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See, e.g., 
Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1982). See generally Seng, 
Private Rights of Action, 27 DE PAULL. REV. 117 (1978); Note, Implied Rights of Action Under 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 68 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1251-54 (1980). The Labor Department under 
the Reagan Administration has taken the position that there is no private right of action under 
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. News and Background Information, LAB. REL. 
REP. (BNA) 268 (1981). 
15. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 
(1981); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. 
Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 
1977). But cf. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Coleman v. Darden, 
595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332 
(N.D. Cal. 1979). 
16. See, e.g., F. BOWE, REHABILITATING AMERICA 68-76e (1980); tenBroek, The Right to Live 
in the World: The Disabled in The Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 841, 883-96 (1966); Hull, 
Forward - The Specter of Equality: Reflections On The Civil Rights of Physically Handicapped 
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precipitated the bus and mass transit legislation that now provides in-
adequate service to the handicapped at enormous public cost. 11 
Evaluating whether the handicapped should be brought under the pro-
tection of Title VII does not imply that the handicapped do not deserve 
assistance. Rather, it may be that a model of motivated discrimination 
is not appropriate for dealing with the employment problems of the 
handicapped. Even the disparate impact test developed under Title VIl' 8 
may not be well-suited for dealing with the range of problems- that 
will be encountered in providing and expanding job opportunities for 
the handicapped. 
Many of the problems of the handicapped are individual problems, 
affected by both the particular physical or mental condition of the 
handicapped person and the requirements of the position in which 
employment is sought. Moreover, the number of handicapped persons 
in the United States is so great that any attempt to provide a com-
prehensive program of job opportunities for the handicapped could 
become an inordinately costly undertaking. In 1973, for example, 
estimates of the number of handicapped ranged from 7. 7 million to 
31 million.19 
This Article argues that the employment problems of the handicapped 
Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 944, 951 (1977); Note, Public Transportation and the Handicapped, 
25 WAYNE L. REV. 135 (1978). 
17. This new legislation supplies transportation to only seven percent of the severely han-
dicapped at a cost per ride almost five times as great as that of a taxi plan which would serve 
26% of the same population. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, URBAN TRANSPOR-
TATION FOR HANDICAPPED PERSONS: ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL APPROACHES (1979). This report in-
dicates that the transit plan developed by the Department of Transportation - requiring wheelchair 
lifts and "kneeling" mechanisms on buses, elevators for subways, and adaptation for wheelchairs 
on one car per train - will serve no more than seven percent of the severely disabled persons 
at a cost of about $38 per trip. Id. at xii-xiii. The taxi plan developed by the Department is 
no more economical; it would serve 26% of severely disabled persons at an average cost of about 
$7.62 per trip. Id. at xiii-xiv. The Department's auto plan, which would provide assistance for 
disabled persons to purchase and specially equip their own cars, would make transportation available 
for 300/o of the severely disabled population at a cost of about $7 .33 per trip. Total costs after 
30 years would be less under either the taxi plan or the auto plan. Id. at xiv-xvi, 64-65. The 
estimated cost of adapting the mass transit system (in 1979 dollars) over the next 30 years, equals 
two and one-half times the former annual federal expenditures on all transit programs ($6.8 
billion). The total cost during the same period would be only $4.8 billion for a more flexible 
and adjustable taxi plan or $6.7 billion for the auto plan. Id. at xii, 45. 
The Rapid Transit Department of the City of Los Angeles recently reported that although 
its 1,140 buses will all be equipped with lifts costing $15,000 each, of the 250,000 to 300,000 
daily boardings only three to five will be by persons in need of the lifts. Starr, Wheels of Misfor-
tune, 264 HARPER'S 8, 13 (Jan. 1982). 
18. A practice that is neutral on its face and has a disparate impact on members of a class 
protected by Title VII will be held a violation of the law unless the employer can establish a 
business necessity for the practice. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
19. M. BERKOWITZ, W. JOHNSON, & E. MURPHY, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD DISABILITY 14 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as BERKOWITZ]. See also Note, Potluck Protection for Handicapped 
Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 
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are not well-suited for treatment under a statutory discrimination model. 
Underlying this argument is the belief that the concept of discrimina-
tion is not adaptable to the problems of the handicapped, and efforts 
to apply it will only worsen existing problems. Part I begins by defining 
the meaning of discrimination, and then explores the similarities and 
differences between discrimination against the handicapped, and 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, and national origin. The 
purpose of this discussion is to provide a basic framework for under-
standing claims that the handicapped should be protected under a 
discrimination model like Title VII. Parts II, III, and IV examine the 
multitude of problems that arise when the employment problems of 
the handicapped are addressed under a statutory discrimination model. 
Part II focuses on two specific provisions of Title VII - the bona 
fide occupational qualifications defense and the accommodations re-
quirement - that would prove extremely difficult to apply to the han-
dicapped. Part III discusses general judicial and administrative concerns 
that make implementation of a remedy like Title VII problematic, while 
Part IV explores the "disincentives" that would encourage the handi-
capped not to take advantage of a statutory discrimination remedy, 
were it to exist. Finally, Part V proposes alternative methods for im-
proving the employment prospects of the handicapped that avoid the 
problems of a statutory discrimination model. 
I. COMPARING THE HANDICAPPED WITH TRADITIONAL 
TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS 
A. The Meanings of Discrimination 
Employment discrimination occurs when persons who are equally 
capable and qualified for employment are treated differently because 
of a factor that is irrelevant to their performance as employees. Tradi-
tionally, the concept of discrimination has involved the element of 
motivation. The actor or decision-maker imposes different treatment 
8 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 814 (1977). Data collected by the Bureau of the Census for 1976 indicated 
that 16.6 million adults reported some level of work disability. These individuals constituted 
13% of the population aged 18 to 64. S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979). A survey 
conducted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare indicates that in 1966 there 
were 17. 7 million disabled persons in the American labor force, 6.1 million of whom were severely 
disabled; the disabled constituted 17.2% of the labor force and the severely disabled constituted 
5.9% of the labor force. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 2, FROM THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 1966 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SSSD REPORT No. 2). 
This survey defined disability as a limitation created by a chronic health condition lasting more 
than three months on the type or amount of work one can perform. Disabled adults unable 
to work regularly were classified as severely disabled. Persons limited to part-time work were 
classified as occupationally disabled. Persons limited in the type or amount of work they could 
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out of a belief that it is right, proper, or just that variant treatment 
be practiced whenever that factor is noted. Title VII litigation has 
developed the phrase "disparate treatment" for cases in which motivated 
discrimination is practiced. 2° Frequently, motivated discrimination stems 
from a prejudice that attributes certain supposed characteristics or defi-
ciencies to members of a class without regard for whether the individual 
involved has those characteristics or suffers from those.deficiencies. 
It is this prejudice, rather than an individual worker's inability to per-
form in the workplace, that leads to the denial of job opportunities. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 expanded upon the concept of employ-
ment discrimination by proscribing employment practices that, although 
neutral on their face, have a significant disparate impact upon persons 
of different races, sex, religion, or national origin. Under the Act, prac-
tices not based on a business necessity are deemed unjustified and ar-
bitrary barriers to employment, adversely affecting protected classes. 
Title VII case law has established that such practices are unlawful 
employment practices. 2 1 
The American public is not committed to the propositions that dif-
ferences in race should be irrelevant for all employment determinations, 
and that differences in sex, religion, and national origin almost always 
should be irrelevant. Variant treatment of employees on these bases 
is generally considered to be anti-social behavior. There appears to be 
no equal commitment, however, to the proposition that a physical or 
mental handicap is always, or almost always, irrelevant to qualification 
for employment. Variant treatment on the basis of handicaps that im-
pair an employee's ability to work is not likely to be considered anti-
social behavior. It does not easily fit within the traditional perjorative 
concept of discrimination. 
B. Similarities Between Employment Problems of the 
Handicapped and Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, 
Religion, and National Origin 
Facially neutral employment practices often impose limitations upon 
the employment of handicapped in ways that are comparable to prac-
tices held unlawful under Title VII's disparate impact standard. Using 
do, and who were able to work full time, were classified as having a "secondary work limita-
tion." OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. I, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF TIIE 
DISABLED: 1966 15 (1968). In 1966 there were five million occupationally disabled persons con-
stituting 4.9% of the labor force. In 1966 there were 6.6 million persons with secondary work 
limitations, constituting 5.2% of the labor force. See supra SSSD REP. No. 2 at 5. 
20. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). 
21. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). See also supra note 
18 and accompanying text. 
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stairs in place of ramps, locating of elevator buttons above a level 
reachable from a wheelchair, and designing doors that are too narrow 
to permit passage of a wheelchair are common examples. Except for 
such practices, handicapped persons would be as qualified and capable 
of performing some types of work as are non-handicapped persons. 
Thus, insofar as these practices closely resemble neutral unlawful 
employment practices prohibited by Title VII, an argument can be made 
that Title VII should be extended to cover the handicapped. 
Persons with epileptic conditions are a classic example of a class 
against which discrimination has been practiced in much the same 
manner that motivated discrimination has been practiced against racial 
minorities, women, and persons of certain national origin. In 1956 seven-
teen states prohibited marriage of epileptics, and eighteen states provided 
that epileptics should be sterilized. 22 By 1966 only three states prohibited 
marriage of epileptics, but thirteen still had sterilization statutes. 23 By 
1976 the three states which had prohibited marriage of epileptics had 
repealed those statutes, and the number of states providing for steriliza-
tion of epileptics was reduced to five. 24 Thus, as with racial discrimina-
tion, substantial progress for epileptics has been made in recent years. 
Yet, members of a society that so recently visited repressive measures 
upon a class of persons are not likely to cease discriminating 
immediately; epileptics will continue to be discriminated against in other 
ways. 
Enormous progress has been made in recent years in the control of 
epileptic seizures through medication, with the result that today those 
with epileptic conditions are able to work safely in occupations that 
previously involved unreasonable danger to themselves and others. 25 
Nevertheless, a significant number of employers flatly refuse to hire 
epileptics without adequate consideration of the effect the condition 
will have on safety and job performance. 26 A disqualification barring 
22. R. BARROW & H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 30, 42-56 (2d ed. 1966). 
23. Id. at 30, 42. 
24. See generally EPILEPSY FOUNDATION, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH EPILEPSY (1976). 
See also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization 
of Handicapped Persons, 50 Temp. L.Q. 995 (1977). 
25. As long ago as the late 1960's it was estimated.that approximately 85% of patients with 
recurrent seizures could obtain complete or nearly complete control with medication, 8 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 695 (1968). See also 5 McGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 42 (1977). A recent study indicates that those who have experienced a seizure but 
have been in remission for a period of five years, retain a 6511,10 chance of staying in remission 
for ten years, and a 76% chance of staying in remission for 20 years. For those not taking 
anti-convulsant drugs the possibility of remaining in remission was considerably lower. See 
Annegers, Hauser, & Elveback, Remission of Seizures and Relapse in Patients with Epilepsy, 
20 EPILEPSIA 729, 73) (1979). 
26. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, D.O.L. BmL. No. 923, THE PERFORMANCE OF PHYSICALLY 
IMPAIRED WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 116-17 (1948); Sands & Zalkind, Effects of 
an Educational Campaign to Change Employer Attitudes toward Hiring Epileptics, 13 EPILEPSIA 
87, 94 (1972). 
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epileptics from employment solely because they are epileptics serves 
no business purpose for many employers. Indeed, this refusal to employ 
results from an overgeneralization about the disability effects of epilepsy 
that is remarkably similar to the prejudiced decision of a racially biased 
employer. 
Victims of cancer are subject to similar discriminatory treatment in 
employment. Like epilepsy, cancer is used by lay persons to describe 
what is medically not a single disease. It is now recognized that cancer 
consists of more than a hundred different diseases, each of which has 
its own characteristics and prognosis. 21 Not all malignancies result in 
early incapacitation or death, but employers frequently refuse to hire 
a person with a history of cancer. A study performed in 1972 by the 
California Division of the American Cancer Society concluded that 
most corporations and governmental agencies in that state discriminated 
in hiring against job applicants for an average period of five years 
after treatment for cancer. 28 The study revealed that this discrimina-
tion by employers stemmed from concerns that applicants with cancer, 
or a history of cancer, might not survive long enough to justify the 
training, that they might need extended periods of sick leave, and that 
they would cause increases in the cost of health insurance, workers' 
compensation, and life insurance. Some employers apparently believed 
that other employees might object to employees who were cancer vic-
tims because of the erroneous belief that cancer is contagious. 29 
This discrimination cannot be justified by failure of performance 
in the workplace. A study performed in 1972 by The Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company of its employees who were known to have had 
treatments for cancer indicated that their work record was good relative 
to non-cancer employees of the same age and position and that turnover 
was average. Their absence record was considered satisfactory and work 
performance adequate as compared with non-cancer employees. The 
conclusion was that the selective hiring of persons who have been treated 
for cancer in positions for which they are physically qualified is a sound 
industrial practice. 30 A study performed one year later of employees 
of the Bell Telephone system produced similar conclusions. 31 It thus 
appears that a substantial proportion of those persons who have had 
27. Perlman, Rehabilitation in the 1980's In Serving Persons with Invisible Handicaps Such 
as Cancer, Heart Disease, Epilepsy, 45 J. OF REHABILITATION, Jan.-Mar. 1979, at 16. 
28. R. McKenna, Employability and Insurability of the Cancer Patient, 2-3 (Nov. 25, 1974) 
(unpublished paper presented at the National Conference on Advances in Cancer Management) 
(on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
29. Id. 
30. Wheatley, Cunnick, Wright, & van Keuren, The Employment of Persons With A History 
of Treatment for Cancer, 33 CANCER 441, 445 (1974). 
31. R. Stone, Remarks at the American Cancer Society's National Conference on Human 
Values & Cancer (June 22, 1972) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
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treatment for cancer suffer unjustifiable and discriminatory loss of job 
opportunities. 
It is a wide-spread belief that "a good back" is a requirement for 
work as a manual laborer and that a spinal deformity increases the 
exposure to injury. 32 Applicants for employment are frequently required 
to undergo medical examinations which include the taking of X-rays 
of the spinal column. Some employers impose such a qualification even 
though the job does not require strenuous work. 33 This requirement 
makes as much sense as barring the applicant from manual labor, 
because white collar workers are afflicted with low back pain as fre-
quently as laborers. 34 Indeed, several studies indicate that there is no 
difference between the incidence of low back pain in groups with low 
back abnormalities discoverable by X-ray and groups without such ab-
normalities. Degenerative changes in intevertebral discs are a common 
accompaniment of chronic back pain, but they usually do not appear 
in pre-symptomatic patients. 35 It thus appears that a physical abnor-
mality of the spinal column without symptomatic behavior may provide 
no more of a rational basis for barring a person from employment 
than the color of his skin. 
Furthermore, tensions from lack of familiarity with handicapped 
persons create barriers similar to those created by lack of familiarity 
with persons of other races. 36 Normal or non-handicapped persons alter 
their behavior in the presence of a person with a physical handicap 
and evaluate the performance of handicapped persons differently than 
they evaluate non-handicapped persons. Psychological studies provide 
specific illustrations. In these studies a non-handicapped person was 
given the appearance of being handicapped in approximately half of 
his or her encounters with the subjects tested. Non-handicapped persons 
frequently reported that they were uncomfortable interacting with the 
apparently handicapped person. 37 Long-term associations between handi-
capped and non-handicapped persons are avoided 38 and non-
handicapped persons come less physically close to handicapped persons 
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Common 
knowledge and experience reflect the problems degenerative backs create for employer, employee, 
and fellow employee alike."). 
33. Western Weighing Bureau v. DILHR, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1733 (Wis. Cir. 
Ct. Dane County 1977). 
34. See Rockey, Fantel, Omenn, Discriminatory Aspects of Pre-employment Screening: Low-
Back X-ray Examinations in the Railroad Industry, 5 AM. J. OF LAW & MED. 197, 202 (1979). 
35. Id. at 207. 
36. See Word, Zanna, & Cooper, The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in 
Interracial Interaction, J. OF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 109-20 (1974). 
37. See Klick, Ono, & Hastdorf, The Effects of Physical Deviance Upon Face-to-Face In-
teraction, 19 HUM. REL. 425 (1966); See also Richardson, Hastdorf, Goodman & Dornbusch, 
Cultural Uniformity in Reaction to Physical Disabilities, 26 AM. Soc. REv. 241-47 (1961). 
38. See Kleck, Ono, & Hastdorf, supra note 37. 
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than to others. 39 In these experimental studies, non-handicapped persons 
tended to demonstrate less variability in their behavior when interacting 
with apparently physically disabled persons; they engaged in less 
nonverbal behavior such as gestures; they terminated the interaction 
sooner than with non-handicapped persons; and they expressed opinions 
that were less representative of their actual beliefs than those expressed 
when interacting with a nondisabled group. 40 In addition, handicapped 
persons experience difficulty in being accepted as a whole person and 
judged on the basis of attributes other than their handicaps. 41 Of par-
ticular significance for permanence of employment is the tendency of 
non-handicapped persons to give an unduly favorable initial appraisal 
of the performance of assigned tasks by apparently handicapped 
individuals. 42 
These results are not inconsistent with other studies examining 
reactions to physical handicaps. It has been found, for instance, that 
ex-mental patients suffer a stigma in employment interviews equal to 
that of an ex-convict. 43 Sighted persons are shocked when a blind person 
dances or enters a barber shop unattended. 44 Waiters ask accompanying 
family or friends what a blind person wishes to eat. 45 It is assumed 
that mental patients will act in a bizarre way or are always dangerous. 46 
Moreover, it is commonly believed by employers that the handicapped 
have a higher accident rate and are generally undesirable employees. 47 
Yet, a study conducted a 1975 by E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Com-
pany of the work records of 1,452 disabled employees revealed that 
a great majority of those employees had average or better than average 
ratings for job performance, safety, and attendance. 48 In 1947, pursuant 
39. See Richardson, Attitudes and Behavior Toward the Physically Handicapped, reprinted 
in THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION, BIRTH DEFECTS ORIGINAL ARTICLES SERIES 15, 20 (1976); Kleck, 
Physical Stigma and Task Oriented Interactions, 22 HUM. REL. 53, 59 (1969). 
40. See Kleck, Ono, & Hastdorf, supra note 37, at 435; Richardson, supra note 39, at 21; 
Kleck, Physical Stigma and Nonverbal Cues Emitted in Face-to-Face Interaction, 21 HUM. REL. 
19, 20-21, 27 (1968). 
41. See Richardson, supra note 39, at 20; Mehr, Mehr, & Ault, Psychological Aspects of 
Low Vision Rehabilitation, 47 AM. J. OPTOMETRY 605, 609 (1970); Lukoff, Attitudes Toward 
the Blind, in ATTITUDES TOWARD BLIND PERSONS I (1972). 
42. See Farina, Sherman, & Allen, The Role of Physical Abnormalities in Interpersonal Percep-
tion and Behavior, 73 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 590, 591-92 (1968); Richardson, supra note 39, at 
21; Kleck, supra note 40, at 27; Kleck, supra note 39, at 58-59. 
43. See Brand & Claiborn, Two Studies of Comparative Stigma: Employer Attitudes and 
Practices Toward Rehabilitated Convicts, Mental and Tuberculosis Patients, 12 COMMUNITY MENTAL 
HEALTH J. 168 (1976). 
44. See E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA 119-20 (1963). 
45. See Mehr, Mehr, & Ault, supra note 41, at 609. 
46. See Dickerson, Myths and Misconceptions of Mental Illness, 46 J. REHABILITATION 28 (1980). 
47. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, D.O.L. BULL. No. 234, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE 
PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER 12 (1961). 
48. See Sears, The Able Disabled, 41 J. REHABILITATION 19, 21 table E. (1975); see also Equal 
Employment Opportunity For the Handicapped Act of 1979, Hearings on S. 446 before the Senate 
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to a request of the Veterans Administration, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics conducted a study of the work records of 17,000 handicap-
ped persons, and it came to a similar conclusion. 49 The fear of employers 
that the handicapped will have a higher accident rate reflects their con-
cern for workers compensation insurance costs. The DuPont Company, 
however, experienced no greater costs for its disabled employees. 50 
Like racial minorities 51 and women, a disproportionate share of the 
handicapped experience poverty and low income. The disproportionate 
amount of poverty experienced by racial minorities is well-established. 
Women earn on the average less than sixty percent of the wages or 
salaries received by men. 52 The Social Security Administration's survey 
of the disabled indicated that in 1966 27.5% of the unemployed reported 
themselves being disabled, 53 although disabled persons constituted but 
13.40/o of the labor force. 54 Studies of disability indicate that blacks 
are more likely to become disabled than whites, 55 probably because 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. ~91-92 (1979) [hereinafter cited 
as Equal Employment Hearings]. Ninety-six percent of the disabled workers had an average or 
better safety record than other employees; 790/o of the disabled employees rated average or better 
in their attendance records. 
49. See Equal Employment Hearings, supra note 48, at 172 (testimony of Bernard Posner, 
Executive Director of the President's Committee on the Employment of the Handicapped). The 
handicapped had a better safety record than nonhandicapped, they lost no more time from work, 
and they had a better productivity record. See also D.O.L. BuLL. No. 234, supra note 47, at 
6-9; Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII 
To Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 814, 818 (1977) (argu-
ing that a handicapped individual develops personality traits that enable him to surpass the safety 
records of other workers). Similarly, after proper training, the mentally retarded have been found 
to be steady and reliable employees in industries that generally suffer from a very high turnover. 
See, e.g., Fanning, Hiring the Mentally Retarded in Foodservices System, 71 J. AM. DIETETIC 
Assoc. 51 (1977). 
50. See generally Sears, supra note 48. 
51. Only 8.70/o of the white population was below the poverty level in 1978, compared to 
30.60/o of the black population and 21.60/o of the hispanic population. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1980 446 table No. 774 (1980). 
52. Id. at 422 table No. 702. 
53. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 17, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF 
THE DISABLED: 1966 21 (1968). 
54. A 1974 study found that one out of five families on welfare received assistance because 
the head of the household was disabled. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at I. In 1965 the median 
family income of the "severely disabled" was two-thirds that of the median "disabled" family 
income and about one-half that of the median "non-disabled" family income. OFFICE OF RESEARCH 
AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND 
WELFARE, REPORT No. 13, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 1966 10 (1968); 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 19]. FROM THE SocIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 
1966 14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SSSD REPORT No. 19. Limitations on ability to work ob-
viously cause poverty because earnings were the major income source for severely disabled mar-
ried men as well as the partially disabled. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SocIAL SECURITY 
AoMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 16, FROM 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 1966 28 (1968). 
55. See SSSD REPORT No. 19 supra note 54, at 3; BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 75. 
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functional limitations affect physical labor and are more likely to pro-
duce disability and lack of employment among blacks than among 
whites. This reinforces the observation that the handicapped are more 
likely than others to be poor and members of racial minorities. 
As with racial minorities, inadequacies in education play a significant 
part in reducing the job opportunities for the handicapped. This is 
due in large part to the inadequacy of the educational opportunities 
that, until recently, 56 were available to handicapped children. In 1970 
more than forty percent of the disabled children awarded benefits under 
the Social Security Act had never been to school and only twenty percent 
had completed one or more years of high school. 51 Forty-five percent 
of those persons receiving worker disability benefits in 1970 had an 
education of eighth grade or less, and approximately thirty-two per-
cent had completed high school. 58 By comparison, in 1970, only 5.3% 
of the general population had less than five years of schooling and 
55.2% of the general population had four years of high school or 
more. 59 
Lack of educational experience contributes to lack of work experience, 
and, as with racial minorities, the under-employment of the handicapped 
is in part caused by their lack of prior work experience. The considerably 
higher rate of unemployment of black and other minority youths has 
an effect upon their income not only during their youth, but subse-
quently in the jobs they receive as mature adults. 60 Lack of experience 
leaves them untrained and unprepared for better paying jobs. 61 Lack 
56. See generally, Note, Equal Educational Opportunity for the Handicapped, 12 LOY. L.A.L. 
REV. 683 (1979) (contending that proper enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 may improve educational opportunities for the handicapped). In 1978 there were 3,777,000 
handicapped children receiving special services in education. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1979 357 table No. 575 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT]. 
57. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY APPLICANT STATISTICS 14 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as SSDAS/1970]. Cf SSSD REPORT No. 19, supra note 54, at 3-4. 
58. See SSDAS/1970, supra note 57, at 46. 
59. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 144 table No. 228. 
60. In 1978, 13.50Jo of white males aged 20 to 24 were unemployed, whereas 34.40/o of black 
males of the same age were unemployed. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 396 table 
No. 650. The median weekly earnings of white male workers in 1978 was $279, whereas the 
median weekly earnings of black and other male workers in 1978 was $218. Id. at 420 table No. 691. 
61. Ninety-four percent of all men between the ages of 18 and 64 worked at some time dur-
ing 1965, but only 800Jo of all the disabled and only 420/o of the severely disabled worked at 
some point during 1965. See SSSD REPORT No. 19, supra note 54, at 12. Fifty-five percent of 
all women aged 18 to 64 worked at some time during 1965, but only 41 OJo of all disabled women 
and 290Jo of seriously disabled women worked in 1965. Id. at 12. Those who become disabled 
are less likely to obtain job experience that will qualify them for other work. For example, for 
those with epilepsy, low occupational status has been associated with an early onset of seizures. 
See Dikmen & Morgan, Neuropsychological Factors Related to Employability and Occupational 
Status in Persons with Epilepsy, 168 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES 236, 237 (1980). For 
the year 1965, about half of the disabled working population was employed at semi-skilled or 
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of prior work experience of handicapped makes it risky for employers 
to make those investments necessary to provide accommodations for 
the handicapped. 62 
An older person is more likely to suffer from a handicap than is 
a younger person. In 1966 the median age of the total non-institutional 
population aged eighteen to sixty-four was forty, whereas the median 
age of the disabled was fifty; two-fifths of the non-institutional 
population were in the eighteen to thirty-four age range, while less than 
a fifth of the disabled fell in that group. 63 The median age for the 
onset of disability was thirty-seven, 64 and only one-sixth of the severely 
disabled adults had first become disabled during childhood. 65 The 
prevalence of severe disability increased sharply with age, from less 
than two percent of the adults aged eighteen to thirty-four to sixteen 
percent of those aged fifty-five to sixty-four, a ratio of approximately 
ten to one. 66 Thus, those who might be victims of age discrimination 
in employment include many who might also be victims of handicap 
discrimination in employment. 
The 1966 Social Security Survey of the disabled indicated that there 
may be a similar overlap of sex and handicap discrimination victims. 
Although the disability prevalence rates in total were the same for men 
and women, the proportion of women classified as severely disabled 
(unable to work at all or to work regularly) was considerably higher 
for women than it was for men. 67 Moreover, a comparison of men 
and women by diagnostic classification of disability indicated that, with 
the exception of nervous system disorders, the effect of a disability 
on employment was much greater for women than it was for men. 68 
unskilled occupations at the onset of disability; only one-fifth had white collar jobs, while more 
than two-fifths of the non-disabled labor force held white collar jobs. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND 
STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINlSTRATION, U.S. 0EP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
REPORT No. 7, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 1966 2 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as SSSD REPORT No. 7). 
62. See I EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A STUDY OF AC-
COMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS, FINAL REPORT, 
iii (1982). 
63. See SSSD REPORT No. 19, supra note 54, at 2. 
64. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T. 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 18, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY 
OF THE DISABLED: 1966 4, 10 (1972). 
65. See SSSD REPORT No. 7, supra note 61, at 19 (1969). 
66. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 3, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE 
DISABLED: 1966 3 (1968); see also BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 21. 
67. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 2, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE 
DISABLED: 1966 2-3 (1968). (Only 4.707o of non-institutionalized men aged 18 to 64 were found 
to be severely disabled, whereas 7 .OO?o of the women in that age group were severely disabled). 
See also BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 9. 
68. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T 
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Moreover, like members of a racial minority who are frequentiy 
shunted into lower paying jobs because of a tacit assumption by em-
ployers and employees that arduous, dirty, and unpleasant jobs should 
be assigned to minority employees, 69 similar assumptions and the rigidity 
of employment practices result in the assignment of seriously handicap-
ped people to dead-end, low paying jobs with marginal employers. 10 
Finally, many physical and mental handicaps are, like race and sex, 
unalterable characteristics of the person. To permit those unalterable 
characteristics to affect employment opportunities has an oppressive 
effect in a society in which the job a person has is likely to be taken 
as the definition of what kind of a person he or she is. 11 Just as Black 
Pride is an assertion of the human worth of black persons, arguments 
based on the necessity of mainstreaming handicapped assert the dignity 
and worth of the handicapped. 72 
C. Differences Between Employment Problems of the 
Handicapped and Employment Problems Created 
by Racial, Sex, Religious, and National 
Origins Discrimination 
As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act contained 
no definitions of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This 
reflected a belief that membership in the protected classes could be 
established with such certainty that definitional problems would not 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 24, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY 
OF THE DISABLED: 1966 4 table B (1972). For example, 53.3% of men suffering a severe disability 
of musculo-skeletal disorders were employed whereas only 30.1 OJo of women with similarly severe 
disorders were employed. Over 95% of men with a secondary work limitation were employed, 
while less than 55% of the women with secondary limitations were employed. 
69. See H. NORTHRUP, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN BASIC INDUSTRY 723-30 (1970). 
70. Craft, Benecki & Shkop, Who Hires the Seriously Handicapped, 19 INDUS. REL. 94 (1980). 
On the other hand, the successful handicapped person is subject to a threat of over-exposure 
and overwork similar to that experienced by successful members of racial minorities. E. GOFF-
MAN, STIGMA 25-27 (1963). 
It is also important to note that there is a recognizable similarity between the rivalries and 
disputes that have arisen between various racial minorities and women and rivalries that have 
surfaced beteen various handicapped groups. See, e.g., Lab. Rel. Yrbk. (BNA) 353 (1977) (Hispanic 
organizations contend the EEOC has not devoted sufficient attention to the employment discrimina-
tion problems of the Spanish-speaking population); 1978 Lab. Rel. Yrbk. BNA 343, 344 (1978) 
(women's groups critical of settlement praised by EEOC and General Electric Corporation). See 
generally Nieto, The Chicana and The Women's Rights Movement, 6 Crv. RTS. DIG. 36, 41 
(1974). The blind, for example, have a preferred position with respect to who is "in need of 
a regular aid and attendance" for the purposes of veterans' non-service connected disabilities. 
Veterans and Survivors Pension Interim Adjustment Act of 1975, 38 U.S.C. 502(b) (1976). These 
achievements have excited the envy of other disabled persons. 
71. Cf. Black, The Workaday World: Some Problems on Return of Mental Patients to the 
Community in PATIENT AND THE MENTAL HOSPITAL 577-78 (1957). 
72. Cf. K. HULL, THE RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PEOPLE 17-38 (1979). 
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hamper enforcement of the statute. 73 There is no justification for com-
parable confidence that the meaning of handicapped is well-established 
or self-evident. To the contrary, it is apparent that ·definitional prob-
lems will complicate enforcement of a statutory prohibition of discrim-
ination against the handicapped to a far greater degree than they have 
with enforcement of a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, or national origins. 
A common dictionary definition of "handicap" is "a disadvantage 
that makes achievement unusually difficult; especially: a physical dis-
ability that limits the capacity to work. " 74 The original definition of 
a handicapped individual for the purposes of The Rehabilition Act of 
1973 was: " ... any individual who (A) has a physical or mental dis-
ability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial 
handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit 
in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services 
provided pursuant to the Act. " 75 The definition was changed the 
following year by the addition of the following language: " ... such 
term means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life ac-
tivities, (B) has a record of such an impairment or (C) is regarded as 
having such an impairment."16 In 1978 the definition added in 1974 
was further modified by an amendment providing that for the purposes 
of the required affirmative action programs and the prohibition of 
discrimination in federally financed programs: 
. . . such term does not include any individual who is an 
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs 
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job 
in question or whose employment, by reason of such current 
alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to prop-
erty or the safety of others. 11 
These changes in the statutory definition give a preliminary but inade-
quate warning of the definitional problems involved. 
73. Partial definitions of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), and sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), 
have since been added to remedy problems concerning the coverage of the Act. In addition, 
the Supreme Court has clarified the meaning of national origin. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. 
Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). 
74. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UN-
ABRIDGED 1027 (1971). 
75. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7, 87 Stat. 355, 361 (amended 1974). 
76. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § lll(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 
1619 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1976)). 
77. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 2, 92 Stat. 2977, 2985 (codified as amended at 29 U .S.C. § 706 
(1976 & Supp. II 1978)). 
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Almost all persons suffer some limitation which could curtail a major 
life activity. Is a person with an I.Q. of ninety handicapped? Are obese 
or merely fat people so impaired with respect to major life activities 
that they are handicapped?7 8 Are persons who experience chronic pain 
with no detectible organic source handicapped? Achondroplastic dwarfs 
most certainly are handicapped, but are midgets, or proportionate 
dwarfs, handicapped? If so, how short must a person be to suffer an 
impairment which constitutes a handicap? Is unusually great height 
a handicap for persons other than basketball players? 
Race, color, sex, and national origins are unalterable characteristics. 
A physical impairment may substantially limit a major life activity, 
but not permanently. How long must such an impairment exist to 
become a handicap deserving protection? Are the residual effects of 
a "whiplash" neck injury persisting for less than one year after the 
accident, but requiring the use of a Thomas collar, a handicap deserving 
protection? 80 If so, is a fractured leg or arm similarly a handicap 
deserving statutory protection until the bone has mended? Does preg-
nancy become a physical handicap at the very time when limitations 
on employment would no longer be considered sex discrimination? 
Is a condition which causes greater exposure than normal to in-
capacitating injury a handicap despite present ability to peform? For 
example, is a person handicapped by a deformity of the spinal column 
that does not presently interfere with movement but is believed by many 
to entail a greater risk than normal of injury in the course of heavy 
manual labor? A federal district court has concluded that, because of 
its effect upon employment opportunities, such a condition could con-
stitute a handicap. 81 A Wisconsin court held that a job applicant having 
acute lymphocytic leukemia, which created a risk of infection from 
normal or minor injuries, was a handicapped individual entitled to pro-
78. See Comment, Voluntary Handicaps - Should Drug Abuse, Alcoholism and Obesity 
Be Protected by Pennsylvania's Anti-Discrimination Laws? 85 DICK. L. REV. 475 (1981) (sum-
marizing a Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission decision in which the Commission found 
that the Philadelphia Electric Company improperly denied employment to an otherwise qualified 
applicant for a position as a customer service clerk because she weighed 341 pounds; the Com-
pany was ordered to offer her the next available position as customer service clerk and to pay 
her back pay with interest). See also Parolisi v. Board of Examiners, 55 Misc. 2d 546, 285 N.Y.S.2d 
936 (1967) (holding that denial of a teacher's license to a woman because she weighed 221 pounds 
violated her constitutional right to due process). 
79. Achondroplasia is an abnormality which results in ossification of the ends of long bones 
with premature union of the epyslyses, producing dwarfs with shortened legs and arms. THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE J J (I 976). 
80. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) (held 
that this type of an impairment does not constitute a handicap within the meaning of a Rhode 
Island statute prohibiting employment discrimination because of a physical handicap). 
81. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980) (granting partial 
summary judgment on review of administrative proceeding, 19 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. (BNA) 
1624 (U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1979)). 
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tection if he could perform the job at the time of application. 82 On 
the other hand, the Illinois Appellate court reached the conclusion that 
being the recipient of a kidney transplant (and therefore restricted from 
heavy lifting) was not a physical condition of the sort to which employ-
ment protection extended under either the Illinois Constitution or an 
Illinois statute. 83 
Determination of whether a person is handicapped by a condition 
which exposes that person to greater than normal risk in a particular 
type of employment involves a question of how substantial a barrier 
to the employee the condition must be to constitute a handicap. A 
person with a spinal deformity which bars that person from heavy 
manual labor might perform many other types of work not involving 
heavy exertion. It has been suggested that an individual with acrophobia 
is not handicapped because he cannot work for an accounting firm 
on the thirty-seventh floor of an _office building, and that a person 
five feet five inches tall is not handicapped because he cannot perform 
as the center of a professional basketball team. 84 But should a person 
with an allergy to a particular dust or chemical be considered handi-
capped if that allergen is found only in a few specialized industrial 
plants? 85 Are all fertile women handicapped with respect to employment 
involving exposure to toxic substances? A person with sight in only 
one eye succeeded in placing on the American Hockey League the 
burden of proving that its by-law disqualifying a player with vision of 
less than three-sixtieths in one eye was a bona fide occupational 
qualification. 86 Similar determination to pursue particular occupations 
have appeared in the case reports. 87 
This series of examples - demonstrating how an unusual physical 
characteristic may limit employment opportunities in particular activities 
82. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976). 
83. Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 385 
N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979). 
84. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099, 1100 (D. Hawaii 1980). 
85. Cf. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human 
Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974) (employee with a history of asthma assigned 
to perform cleaning work in a railroad diesel house is a handicapped person entitled to protec-
tion provided there is no showing that the work has hazardous side effects). 
86. Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). 
87. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (sustaining a col-
lege's refusal to make major adjustments in its nursing program to permit a student suffering 
from a serious hearing disability to participate in a clinical training program); Simon v. St. Louis 
County Police Dep't, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (dismissing the 
claim of a former police officer who, because of a service-related injury, sought re-employment 
with appropriate accommodation for his handicap). Doss v. General Motors, 25 Fair Empl. 
Prac.Cas. (BNA) 419 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (inability to wear ear protection because of chronic ear 
infections not sufficient to hold employee handicapped within the meaning of an Illinois statute). 
But cf. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Rela-
tions, supra note 85. 
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- does not justify a conclusion that the problems of the handicapped 
in employment occur only because of individual job preferences. As 
mentioned above, in many situations commonly accepted views of the 
handicapped do produce what closely resembles the bias and prejudice 
experienced by minorities and women. The examples do, however, es-
tablish that employment disabilities of the handicapped are affected 
by the individual's job preferences in a manner not associated with 
the comprehensive job bias experienced by racial minorities and women. 
A consequence is that, by chance, a handicapped applicant for work 
may place upon an employer the burden of proving that absence of 1 
the handicapping condition is a requirement that has a business justifica- 1 
tion or is a bona fide occupational qualification. 
II. APPLYING TITLE VII: THE PROBLEM OF INCONGRUOUS PROVISIONS 
A. Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications, 
Business Necessity, Testing 
Section 703(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act88 contains an ex-
press exception from the prohibition of classification of employees 
on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in those instances in 
which religion, sex, or national origin is "a bona fide occupational 
qualification [bfoq] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise.'' The exception permits classifica-
tion or different treatment of employees on the criteria that would other-
wise be prohibited. Thus, it is not illegal to consider only women to 
play the part of a female in a play or to permit only persons with 
certain religious convictions to perform religious ceremonies. 
The phrase "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" suggests 
that the bfoq defense should be recognized - even though it bars from 
employment an individual who might be capable of performing the job 
- where the expense of testing the applicant's ability to perform would 
be excessive. This version of the bfoq defense has not gained acceptance 
in cases arising under Title VII. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has issued guidelines stating that the bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications defense for sex and national origins should be 
narrowly construed, 89 and the courts have generally agreed. 90 As a result, 
courts have required proof that substantially ·an persons barred from 
employment by a bfoq requirement would be unable to perform the job. 91 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). 
89. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1982); 
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.4 (1982). 
90. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). 
91. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 
1969) ("[T]o rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has the 
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Otherwise individual testing is required. 92 
Problems with bfoq defenses do not frequently arise under Title VII, 
because such defenses are seldom recognized. Moreover, sex, national 
origin, and established religions are established constants. Their effect 
on job performance can be assessed for all persons of the sex, national 
origin, or religion involved. That assessment usually can be made on 
the basis of common experience and common sense. Indeed, common 
experience and common sense strongly suggest that for most jobs sex, 
national origin, or religion have no job performance significance. 
Power tools, power steering, power brakes and the like have elimi-
nated for many jobs the significance greater physical size and strength 
may once have had. If unusual strength is required for a job, it is 
probable that not all men will have such strength, and if an employment 
or on-the-job test is used for male applicants, such tests can be provided 
for female applicants. The idea that certain work is unsuitable for 
women because it is dirty, dangerous, or involves strenuous activity 
reflects a social judgment about the propriety of women's behavior 
rather than a judgment about whether the applicant is capable of per-
forming the job. 93 An airline's preference for young, unmarried women 
as flight attendants may increase business by supporting the fantasies 
of male passengers, but it does not increase the safety or speed of the 
transportation provided. 94 A narrow construction of the bfoq defenses 
under Title VII has largely been possible because narrow constructions 
do not interfere with safe and efficient operation of businesses. 
It is significant, however, that where plausible arguments concerning 
the safety of operati~ns have been presented in Title VII litigation, 
courts have not insisted upon a narrow construction of bfoq defenses 
or required a high level of certainty concerning business justification. 
burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe ... that all or substantially all women 
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."). 
92. The concept of business necessity is related to that of bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion. It applies to those practices of an employer that are neutral on their face but have a disparate 
disqualifying impact upon members of protected classes. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that a pre-employment aptitude test disqualifying a disproportionate 
percentage of members of racial minorities cannot be justified on the grounds of business necessity). 
Even if a test does not explicitly bar an applicant on racial or national origin grounds, the fact 
that it has a disproportionate impact upon protected groups may render it an unlawful employ-
ment practice unless there is a business necessity for its use. That necessity can be established 
by proof that there is a statistically significant relationship between performance on the test and 
performance on the job. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607.148(5) (1982). Business necessity is required for other employment requirements that have 
a disparate impact on protected persons. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
(height and weight limitations); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(consideration of arrest record). 
93. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969). 
94. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 950 (1971). 
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The United States Supreme Court recognized sex as a valid bfoq for 
the position of corrections counselor in an all male penitentiary because 
of the likelihood that inmates, twenty percent of whom were sex of-
fenders, would attack a woman. 95 The possibilities of such attacks were 
thought to pose a threat not only to the woman but to overall control 
of the penitentiary, its inmates, and other correctional personnel. 
According to one Court of Appeals, female flight attendants who 
become pregnant may be required to stop work as soon as the pregnancy 
becomes known because of safety considerations. 96 Another Court of 
Appeals has held that a bus company may refuse to consider applicants 
thirty-five years of age or older for positions as intercity bus drivers 
without violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act97 because 
of safety considerations. 98 
Handicaps vary greatly in nature and severity, and thus differ from 
the generally irrelevant but established constants of sex, national origin, 
and religion. They may be relevant with respect to ability to perform 
the work required and they may also have a greater significance with 
respect to safety considerations. 
In many cases employers do not require absence of a specific handicap 
as a job qualification. Refusal to employ in many cases will result from 
a medical examination or completion of a questionnaire which reveals 
the presence of the condition constituting a handicap. Each determina-
tion will be an individual one. The determination in one case is unlikely 
to turn into a bfoq for subsequent cases. 
A few handicaps have been expressly designated by employers as 
a disqualification from employment: epilepsy, loss or significant im-
pairment of sight or hearing, a history of heart attacks or heart trouble, 
or presence of deformities of the spinal column. In these cases, the 
question will more closely approach that of the bona fide occupational 
qualification defense under Title VII. Even with these conditions, 
though, it frequently will not be feasible to establish absence of a con-
dition as a bfoq. 
Consider, for example, what might initially be thought of as a ques-
tion permitting a simple and standard answer: is absence of a condition 
of epilepsy, even though controlled by medication, a bfoq for employ-
ment near machinery or employment as the driver of a motor vehicle? 
95. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 322-37 (1977). 
96. See Condit v. United Airlines, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
934 (1978). 
97. 29 u.s.c. § 621 (1979). 
98. See Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. 
Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Cf. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 
440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding that even if a rule barring transit system employment to those 
persons using methadone did have a disparate impact on blacks, it could be enforced without 
violating Title VII because it served to protect those who used the transit system). 
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Hazards posed by machinery vary tremendously. Logging operations 
and paper mills probably present great hazards to epileptics because 
the machinery used is likely to turn a brief loss of consciousness into 
a fatality. 99 On the other hand, machinery in the bottling room of a 
soft drink manufacturer probably poses relatively few dangers of in-
jury to an epileptic. All states license epileptics to drive private 
automobiles upon proof that their seizures have been under control 
for a reasonable period of time. 100 Is there a crucial increase, however, 
from the risk of operation of a private automobile to operation of 
a taxi, a bus, a large truck, an earth moving tractor, or even a fork 
lift in a warehouse? Do the varying number of other employees and 
the range of materials which may be stored in warehouses require dif-
ferent answers for lift drivers in different warehouses? 
There is an equally wide range in the effects of what is considered 
an epileptic condition upon individuals. 101 It is correct to state as a 
generalization that epilepsy is a symptom of brain disturbance. Epilepsy 
appears in so many conditions, however, that the extent to which an 
individual is incapacitated by his epileptic condition requires careful 
and informed medical assessment on an individualized basis. The range 
of hazards in employment and the variation in epileptic c;onditions of 
individuals makes it impossible to establish absence of a condition of 
epilepsy as a qualification for working near all moving machinery or 
to conclude that a history of control of seizures by medication qualifies 
a person for all such employment. 
Similar questions arise concerning both the medical assessment of 
and the significance to job performance for persons who have a history 
of heart trouble, a record of cancer treatment, vision or hearing loss, 
or a record of abuse of drugs or alcohol. As with epilepsy, the question 
of qualification of persons with these conditions for a job involves 
not only determination of their ability efficiently to perform the assigned 
tasks, but concern for their own safety, the safety of other employees, 
and risks to the employer!s plant and equipment. 
There are at present relatively few decisions concerning the validity 
of bfoq defenses under existing state and federal legislation. The 
Supreme Court of Washington did recognize that freedom from epilepsy 
might be a bfoq for the position of laborer in a smelting plant. 102 
It concluded that the record before it did not permit the making of 
99. See K. HULL, THE RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PEOPLE 214-16 (1979). 
100. See R. BARROW & H. fABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 58 (1966). 
101. See Dreifus, The Nature of Epilepsy in EPILEPSY REHABILITATION 8-27 (G. Wright ed. 
1975). Indeed, because of the varying effects of epilepsy, it has recently been suggested that 
the traditional classification of epileptic seizures be abandoned. Gastaut, Clinical and Elec-
troencephalographical Classification of Epileptic Seizures, 11 EPILEPSIA I02,l 14 (1970). 
I02. See Rose v. Hanna Mining, Co., 94 Wash. 2d 307, 616 P.2d 1229 (1980); see also supra 
note 19; R. BARROW & H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 58 (1966). 
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that decision, because the evidence in the record related to the condi-
tion and ability of the individual plaintiff applicant and not to epilepsy 
in general. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court held that a rule 
of the New York Transit Authority barring from employment persons 
using narcotics (including methadone) was so "job related" that it pro-
vided a defense to a Title VII claim based upon the disparate impact 
of the rule. 103 The Court implied that it would be a valid bfoq defense if 
the suit was on the theory that a former drug abuser was a handicapped 
individual. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
in a Title VII suit that "a good back" is so related to job performance 
as a laborer that business necessity justified the denial of employment 
to a black applicant who had a degenerative bone condition of his 
spinal column caused by sickle cell anemia. 104 Here, too, the court 
suggested that the requirement of "a good back" would be a bfoq 
if the suit was based on the theory that the application had been denied 
because the applicant was handicapped. Many decisions, however, show 
no such receptivity to bfoq defenses. 105 
Regulations issued by the Department of Labor to implement Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 leave little room for develop-
ment of bfoq's concerning handicaps. The rules specifically state that 
the recipient of a federal grant may not inquire as to whether an appli-
cant for employment is a handicapped person, but must instead limit 
pre-employment inquiries to the applicant's ability to perform job-related 
103. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
104. See Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). The theory underlying 
the suit was that barring employment based on the existence of a bone degenerative condition 
caused a disparate impact on blacks because of the higher incidence of sickle cell anemia among 
the black population than among the white population. 
105. See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text; E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 
F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii I 980) (concluding that while a spinal condition threatening future 
injury might be a basis under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for denying employment to a carpenter 
apprentice, the propriety of that denial must turn upon medical evidence relating to the appli-
cant's back condition); Connecticut Inst. for the Blind v. Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities, 405 A.2d 618 (1978) (rejecting the use of a bona fide occupational qualification 
defense to justify an requirement that a teacher's aide in a school for the blind have normal 
visual acuity); Bevan v. Teachers' Retirement System, 355 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1974) (refusing to per-
mit the firing of a teacher who had become blind without a hearing on the issue of whether 
the teacher was no longer able to perform his work); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 
(3d Cir. 1977) (refusal to permit a blind applicant for a teaching position to take a qualifying 
test violated the applicant's constitutional rights); Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 
333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (asking a job applicant if he had ever experienced a nervous breakdown 
or undergone psychiatric treatment held violative of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 
280 N.W.2d 142 (1979) (each allgation of handicap discrimination must be individually evaluated 
both with regard to the possibility of injury to the handicapped applicant an to other employees); 
Chicago & North Western R.R. v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 91 Wis. 2d 412, 283 
N.W.2d 603 (1979) (before denying an epileptic applicant employment, a railroad employer must 
demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that as an employee the applicant would have a 
seizure). 
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functions. ' 06 If the employer routinely requires medical examinations 
as part of the employment selection process, the examinations must 
be performed by a physician qualified to make a functional assessment 
of the individual's residual capacity for work or training. 101 The object 
is to provide the ref erring officer adequate information concerning the 
use of limbs and extremities, mobility and posture, endurance, ability 
to withstand various working conditions and the use of senses and 
mental capacity to make decisions on job placement or referral to 
training programs. The determination is thus made on an individual 
basis, through a collaborative effort of a medically trained person and 
a person familiar with the requirements of a job or position. It is 
specifically provided that the examination or inquiries shall not be made 
for the purpose of determining whether the applicant is a handicapped 
person or the severity of the handicap. ' 08 Such inquiry would be 
pertinent only if absence of a specific handicap were recognized as a 
bfoq. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has pro-
posed similar regulations for administration of Section 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. ' 09 
In 1979, Eleanor Holmes Norton, then Chairperson of the EEOC, 
warned a Senate committee that this method of proceeding was likely 
to produce a battle of experts.' 10 Referring to her experience as Chair 
of the New York City Commission on Human Rights in enforcing a nar-
rowly drafted prohibition of discrimination against the handicapped, 
she noted that employers often employed experts to show the disabled 
person could not do the job and that the Commission, with a limited 
budget, was forced to search for volunteer expert witnesses. In most 
cases two experts - one medical and one employment specialist -
will be required for each applicant who challenges a denial of employ-
ment because of a physical or mental condition. Consequently, prepara-
tion of such a defense will be a greater problem for small employers 
than large employers. 
The decisions rejecting bfoq defenses under existing handicap dis-
crimination laws suggest that such def ens es would not be frequently 
!06. See Department of Labor Rules, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Pro-
grams and Activities Receiving or Benefiting From Federal Financial Assistance, 29 C.F.R. § 
32. 15(a) (1982). 
107. 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(c) (1982). 
!08. 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(a) (1982). 
!09. See O.F.C.C.P. Proposed Affirmative Action Obligations of Contractors and Subcon-
tractors for Handicapped Workers, 45 Fed. Reg. 86, 206 (1980) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. 
§ 60-741.5(c)(3) and (5)). 
110. Equal Employment Opportunity For the Handicapped Act of 1979, Hearings on S. 446 
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1979). 
See also Oversight Hearings On Federal Emforcement of EEO Laws before the Subcommittee 
on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 81-83 (1979) (Discussing problems of enforcement due to necessity of expert testimony). 
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recognized if discrimination against the handicapped were prohibited 
by Title VII. If they are not, the result will be an enormous amount 
of individual testing. 
B. Accommodations 
The problems of bona fide occupational qualifications, business 
necessity, and individual testing become even more complicated when 
consideration is given to the relationship between those concepts and 
the Title VII requirement that a reasonable accommodation be made 
for a handicapping condition. 111 Because handicapping conditions are 
so frequently relevant to ability to perform wor-k, expansion of job 
opportunities for the handicapped will frequently require accommoda-
tions by employers. Some experience with an accommodation requirement 
has accumulated under existing federal and state legislation prohibiting 
discrimination against the handicapped although it is both limited and 
discouraging. 112 
The Title VII accommodation requirement exists only with respect 
to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion. The re-
quirement was first set out in guidelines published by EEOC in 1967. 113 
The guidelines stated that the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds includes an obligation on the part of an employer to make 
such reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of employees 
as can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business. The guidelines put the burden of proof of undue 
hardship on the employer. In 1972, Congress expressly added to the 
statute a requirement of accommodation by an amendment of the Civil 
Rights Act. It did so by changing the definition of religion to include 
all aspects of religious practice, " ... unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or pro-
spective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hard-
ship on the conduct of the employer's business." 114 
111. See generally Lang, Protecting The Handicapped From Employment Discrimination: 
The Job Related and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Doctrines, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 
989 (1978). 
112. Cases arising under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act suggest that handicapped persons de-
mand unrealistic accommodations for their handicaps. See, e.g., Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 
332 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (blind applicant for position as school administrator proposes to work 
with the help of a court-appointed aide); Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979) (blind applicant for position as a research assistant to a lawyer 
proposes to work with the help of a reader); Barnes v.Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.C.S.C. 
1977) (deaf student requests services of a sign language interpreter for two courses at a cost 
to the college greater than the price of tuition). See also Note, 3 U. DAYTON L. REV. 449 (1978). 
113. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1980), 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (1967) (advocating the extention 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prevent religious discrimination). 
114. Pub. L. No. 92-2611 S.2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
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Despite this legislative endorsement, the obligation to make reasonable 
accommodation was greatly limited by the Supreme Court in Trans 
World Airlines v. Hardison. 115 The Court held that an employer was 
not obligated to incur more than a de minimus cost to make an ac-
commodation. ~This construction of the statute may have been dictated 
by the consideration that imposition of any more substantial obigation 
presented a possible conflict with the Constitutional prohibition of the 
establishment of religion. This concern would not, of course, exist with 
a statute protecting the handicapped from discrimination. Yet, if the 
case were followed under a statute prohibiting discrimination against 
the handicapped, the limited accommodation required would leave many 
handicapped persons with no protection. It is therefore important to 
determine whether a more meaningful statement of an accommodation 
requirement can be put in legislative form. 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 contains no provision expressly es-
tablishing or defining a duty to accommodate. Surprisingly few of the 
proposals made for amendment of Title VII to prohibit discrimination 
against the handicapped contain provisions relating to the duty to 
accommodate. 116 The Committee Report on the 1979 Senate bill to 
amend Title VII recognized the importance of a duty to accommodate 
in a handicap discrimination law as well as the adverse effect which 
the Supreme Court's decision respecting religious accommodation would 
have if incorporated in such a law. 111 Nevertheless, the Committee did 
not adopt an express accommodation provision. It was instead content 
to state its belief that prohibition of discrimination alone required 
reasonable accommodation unless the employer demonstrated significant 
hardship. 118 The absence of an accommodation provision was not for 
115. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
116. The principal proposal was S. 446 96th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REC. (1979) which was 
the subject of two days of hearings in 1979 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources. It contains no express provision concerning the duty to accommodate. Nor was such 
a provision made in other bills introduced in the House during 1979 and 1980. See, e.g., H.R. 373, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 442 (1979); H.R. 609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. 
REc. 448 (1979); H.R. 3345, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 6849 (1979); H.R. 5510, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 27558 (1979); H.R. 1326, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. 
999 (1979) (containing an express provision excusing employers from a duty to accomodate); H.R. 
1200, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC. H289-90 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983). 
117. S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10 (1979). 
118. Senator Javits proposed a change in the bill that would have established a defense for 
employers who could show that a "significant hardship would result from compliance with the 
no discrimination requirement"; the amendment was not adopted. See News and Background 
Information, 101 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 279, 280 (1979). 
The committee concluded that a requirement of accommodation flows from the prohibition 
of discrimination. This conclusion, however, is rendered suspect by the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981), holding that the prohibition against 
discrimination found in the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Allowance Act does not im-
pose a duty of reasonable accommodation upon an employer. 
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lack of advice about the need to establish a duty of reasonable accom-
modation. The importance of that requirement for the proposed legis-
lation had been emphasized at the hearing by the former Chair of 
EEOC. 119 
Testimony presented at the Senate hearings indicated that accom-
modation frequently can be provided for the handicapped without great 
expense. This argument is supported by the relative ease with which 
careful architectural planning can provide a workplace free of structural 
barriers for persons in wheelchairs. 120 Devices such as visual magnifiers, 
telephone amplifiers, right and left handed typewriters, cassette tape 
recorders, and even talking calculators are also now available at prices 
that do not make employment of the handicapped prohibitive. 121 Ad-
ditionally, some jobs can be restructured to accomodate employment 
of handicapped persons at virtually no cost. A recent study conducted 
for the Department of Labor of accommodations provided to han-
dicapped employees by federal contractors confirms these facts. Over 
fifty percent of the accommodations in the study cost nothing; an ad-
ditional thirty percent cost less than $500; only eight percent cost more 
than $2000. 
The Senate report on the 1979 bill to amend Title VII contained 
a substantial discussion of the possibilities of accommodation, 123 which 
makes its failure to propose an accommodation requirement puzzling. 
It is possible that exposure to the range and variety of accommodations 
available for various handicaps produced a conclusion that it was 
impossible to produce a legislative formulation of an accommodation 
requirement other than that reduced to insignificance in the Hardison 
decision. 
Rules 124 issued by the Department of Labor to implement Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and proposed rule of the Office 
of Federal Contract Compliance Procedures to implement Section 503 
of that Act 125 provide a test for whether a meaningful statement of 
the duty to accommodate can be administratively formulated. 126 The 
Department of Labor rules proposed for application to government 
contractors require, ''. . . reasonable accommodation to the physical 
119. See supra note 110. 
120. See Hearings on S. 44_6, supra note 110, at 175-76, 179, 292. 
121. See Hearings on S. 446, supra note 110, at 103, 175, 192-93, 197. 
122. See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, I A STUDY OF 
ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS, FINAL 
REPORT, ii, 29 (1982). 
123. S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10 (1979). 
124. 29 C.F.R. § 32.1-51 (1980). 
125. Proposed Affirmative Action Requirements for Handicapped Workers, 46 Fed. Reg. 
42,968 (1981) (to be codifed at 41 C.F.R. § 60-74). 
126. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.1-51 (1980). 
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and mental limitations of an employee or applicant unless the contractor 
can demonstrate that such accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the conduct of the contractor's business." 121 Among the 
factors to be considered in determining whether the requirement would 
impose an undue hardship are the size of the operation, the number 
of employees, the type of facilities, financial resources, and the nature 
and cost of the accommodation needed. 
Although the proposed rules provide a framework for analysis of 
the problem of accommodation, they certainly do not offer reliable 
guidance to an employer of what must be done to satisfy an accom-
modation requirement for a particular job. This inadequacy is not likely 
to be remedied by better drafting. The lack of guidance reflects the 
difficulty of making a meaningful generalization about a problem 
involving myriad variations of limitations imposed upon individuals 
for the performance of jobs which vary so much with respect to the 
ability, effort, endurance, and understanding required. The degree to 
which the rules rely on generalization suggests that the problem is not 
susceptible to management by specific and controlling rules, and that 
individualized ad hoc determinations will be needed to determine what 
accommodation is required for each employee. 128 
Our legal system does at times rely upon ad hoc determinations of 
what is required in particular factual situations. For example, reliance 
upon the negligence principle in tort law requires a jury's determination 
of what the reasonably prudent person would have done under like 
circumstances. Concern for the expense of the process suggests the 
desirability of a rule of general application for recurring cases. 
Satisfactory rules, however, are not easily formulated. The classic il-
lustration is the rejection of Justice Holmes's attempt to formuiate 
a rule for all railroad grade crossing cases, with the consequence that 
most cases of that sort are now presented as jury questions. 129 
Alternatively, an administrative agency might be assigned the Her-
culean task of stating the accommodation obligations in detailed rules 
for each industry and each type of job. The product, however, would 
probably become even less manageable than the 761 page Occupational 
Safety and Health Standards which have been promulgated by OSHA. 130 
It thus appears that problems of bona fide occupations qualifications, 
business necessity, testing, and accommodation will be substantially 
127. 46 Fed. Reg. 43,014 (1981). 
128. This conclusion was reached after an extensive Department of Labor study was made 
of accomodations provided to handicapped employees by federal contractors. EMPLOYMENT STAN-
DARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, I A STUDY OF ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO 
HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS, FINAL REPORT, vi-vii (1982). 
129. Compare Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (Holmes Rule) with 
Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (railroad crossing cases are matter for jury). 
130. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1980). 
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different and much more complicated than those encountered with re-
spect to prohibitions on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national 
origin. Adoption of a discrimination model will require a lengthy and 
expensive effort both in developing the governing principles of law and 
the medical and vocational expertise essential to providing for its 
satisfactory administration. 
Ill. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS 
The enormous diversity of handicap impairments will create ad-
ministrative problems for the judiciary or administrative agency charged 
with enforcing the Act that are much more severe than those encountered 
in the enforcement of Title VII's prohibitions of discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. The severity of impairment 
can vary tremendously between individuals and the significance of the 
impairment for employment depends upon what job is under 
consideration. 
Practices that violate Title VII have not and will not be eliminated 
solely through litigation. Educational programs for management and 
the resulting voluntary compliance with the requirements of the law 
are major means of eliminating the prohibited practices. Although there 
are variations from industry to industry and business to business, what 
amounts to discrimination or disparate treatment on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, or national origin is, compared to the problems of the 
handicapped, relatively easy to identify. The EEOC staff has ac-
cumulated an expertise with respect to recurring problems. Because 
many of the problems are similar, an employer charged, for example, 
with sex discrimination may review its treatment of all female employees 
with a view to making those adjustments and corrections required by 
the law. 
In contrast, review of an employer's treatment of epileptics, for 
example, will not provide the same insights about how to treat other 
handicapped persons or, indeed, other epileptics. Nor will EEOC or 
any other enforcing agency be able to offer guidance with the specificity 
it has provided in administration of Title VII in its present form. The 
task would require a staff with medical expertise concerning each type 
of impairment which gives rise to disability, and vocational expertise 
concerning the significance of the impairments upon the whole range 
of employment opportunities. 
Obviously, the threat of litigation and the potential liability has made 
many employers interested in learning what is required by Title VII. 
The threat has provided the incentive for much of the voluntarily 
achieved compliance. It is important to realize, however, that even since 
1972, when the EEOC became authorized to institute suits to enforce 
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Title VII, privately initiated lawsuits have been of greater significance 
in enforcement of the law than EEOC suits. 131 The impact of private 
litigation has been due in large part to the availability of class actions. 132 
Class actions not only produce a remedy which is broad and compre-
hensive; they also generate the substantial attorneys' fees essential to 
private enforcement of the law. 133 
Class actions probably would play no comparable role in suits to 
remedy discrimination in employment against the handicapped. They 
might be useful in granting partial relief against broad disqualifications 
from employment, such as rules prohibiting the hiring of any person 
with a condition of epilepsy or a history of heart disease. 134 Yet, given 
the wide range of epileptic conditions and histories of heart disease 
and the significance of those impairments for the various jobs it seems 
unlikely that classes would be broadly defined. On the contrary, the 
diversity of impairments and their significance in employment requires 
a case by case appraisal of the qualifications of handicapped persons 
to perform the particular jobs in question, and courts would recognize 
this when requested to certify a class. 135 
Efforts to enforce protection of the handicapped through Title VII 
litigation are likely to encounter additional problems. In current litigation 
under Title VII a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with relative 
ease, thus shifting to the employer the burden of articulating some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying him employment. 136 
131. In the 12 month period ending December 31, 1981 the United States was plaintiff in 
only 356 employment civil rights cases. During that same period 5,987 private employment civil 
rights cases were filed. ADMINISTRATNE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1981, A-6, 
table C-2 (1981). Statistics for the preceding year were similar, Id. at A-10, table C-2. Indeed, 
recent criticisms of EEOC operations reveal that the agency began a program in 1978 under 
which it made 201 loans totalling $1.2 million to finance private law suits. EEOC Loans to Title 
VII Advocacy Groups, News and Background Information, I JO LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 137 (1982). 
132. See G. COOPER, H. RABB, H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 324 (1975); Peck, 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the Administrative Process, 
51 WASH. L. REV. 831, 838-42 (1976). 
133. Peck, supra note 132, at 843. See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 
F.2d 714, 716-18 (5th Cir. 1974); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 1975). 
134. See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (suit to invalidate city's 
policy of refusing to employ former drug abusers without consideration of their state of rehabilita-
tion properly brought as class action). 
135. Considerations of this sort led the National Association of Manufacturers, which had 
given its general support to the handicap discrimination bill proposed in 1979, to suggest that 
the bill be amended to include a provision requiring EEOC to investigate and process only in-
dividual cases. Equal Employment Opportunity For The Handicapped Act of 1979, Hearings 
on S. 446 Before The Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
182 (1979) (Statement of David Braithwaite, Chairman, National Association of Manufacturers). 
The underlying rationale for the proposal was based on experience with the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 over a five year period. 
136. A prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII is established when the plain-
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To establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must be qualified for a 
job for which the employer is seeking applicants. For many kinds of 
employment, particularly assembly line or low skill jobs, this proof 
is easily established. This is often not true in cases involving the handi-
capped. Almost every case involving a refusal to hire a handicapped 
individual, requires expert testimony rather than merely the plaintiff's 
account of his employment history and experience in comparable jobs. 137 
Indeed, as mentioned above, lack of experience is a primary reason 
for the low employment status of the handicapped. 
Further, in current litigation under Title VII plaintiffs make frequent 
use of statistics to establish discrimination in employment. 138 The 
diversity of impairments and their significance in various jobs makes 
it unlikely that statistics could be used to establish discrimination with 
respect to a particular plaintiff. The fact that an employer has hired 
few handicapped employees does not provide a basis for concluding 
that the employer denied a plaintiff the requested employment because 
of his particular handicap. 139 
Finally, a question remains as to whether the handicapped constitute 
a sufficiently cohesive group to function effectively as lobbyists, 
supporting the enforcing agency before Congress and monitoring its 
performance. 140 Under current Title VII law, conflicts have developed 
between various minority and women's groups. 141 The existence of more 
than eighty-five separate programs to assist the handicapped with their 
various problems 142 testifies to both a diversity in their problems and 
a single-mindedness concerning particular types of problems. The 
legislative successes of the blind 143 or coal miners with ''black lung'' 
tiff shows "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for 
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications .... The burden then 
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting 
the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See 
also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978); Texas Dep't 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-256 (1981). 
137. Cf. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980) (applicant's 
history, establishing a risk of future back injury, was sufficient to justify employer's rejection 
of his application for work). 
138. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 (1977); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 I U.S. 792, 805 (1973); see generally Copus, The Numbers 
Game is the Only Game in Town, 20 How. L.J. 374 (I 977); Dorsaneo, Statistical Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation: Selection of the Available Population, Problems and Pro-
posals, 29 Sw. L.J. 859 (1975). 
139. See Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DE PAUL 
L. REV. 953, 972 (1978); Note, Rehabilitating the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 58 B.U.L. REV. 
247, 261-62 (1978). 
140. See supra note I 10 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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diseases 144 are not likely to be surrendered for the benefit of all handi-
capped. There is no reason to believe that organizations which have 
had success for members handicapped in a particular way will submerge 
the interests of those members in the general pool of the handicapped. 145 
IV. DISINCENTIVES OF A STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION MODEL 
A. Benefits 
Victims of race or sex discrimination in employment have no financial 
incentive to preserve their employment limitations. The same is not 
true of the handicapped, many of whom would lose income - and 
leisure time - if their handicap no longer barred them from employ-
ment. Large amounts of money are now expended for the benefit of 
the handicapped. More than eighty-five separate programs provide 
benefits and services for the disabled. 146 In 1973 expenditures under 
disability programs constituted 6.3% of the gross national product. 
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits to the disabled and their 
dependents alone quadrupled from about three billion dollars in 1970 
to twelve billion in 1978, and in that same time the number of recipients 
doubled. 147 A substantial proportion of the severely disabled are presently 
receiving such payments. 148 Since 1956, Social Security Disability benefits 
have equaled those that would have been received upon retirement, 149 
and since 1972 these benefits have included adjustments for increases 
in the cost of living. 150 In recent years there has been an increase in 
the ratio of disability benefits to prior earnings. This increase is one 
reason for the recent rapid expansion of the number of recipients of 
Social Security Disability Insurance. 15 1 
143. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
144. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 29. 
145. See F. BOWE, J. JACOBI, L. WISEMAN, COALITION BUILDING: A REPORT ON A FEASABILITY 
STUDY TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL MODEL FOR CROSS DISABILITY COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION 
(1978). See also Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 446 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) (Statement 
of Dr. Frank B. Bowe). Yet organizations representing the interests of the handicapped, such 
as the Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc., do exist. See generally id. 
146. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 25. 
147. News and Background Information, 103 LAB. REL. REP. I (BNA) (1980) (reporting on 
a study directed by Charles W. Meyer, Economist, Iowa State University, on behalf of the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research). As of 1979 almost three million disabled workers 
were receiving benefits. S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 19 (1979). 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. 
149. See Social Security Admendments of 1956, Pub. L. 880, § 103, 70 Stat. 807, 815 (1956). 
150. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 116(e), 86 Stat. 1329, 
1350 (1972). 
151. Miller Preliminary Report on Disability Insurance in REPORTS OF CONSULTANTS ON AC-
TUARIAL AND DEFINITIONAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE 31 (1976). 
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For the purposes of Social Security Disability Insurance a disability 
is defined as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity 
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment." 152 The Social Security Administration has, pursuant to statutory 
authorization, issued regulations defining "substantial gainful activity" 153 
as an occupation producing earnings in excess of $300 per month. 154 
Earnings in excess of this amount could lead to the loss of primary 
insurance payments of as much as $542.80 per month or total family 
benefits of as much as $949.90 per month. 155 
The 1966 Social Security survey of the disabled produced statistics 
confirming the theory that receipt of public income maintenance pay-
ments discourages the handicapped from returning to employment: se-
verely disabled married men and their spouses who received no public 
income maintenance benefits had greater total income than Social Secur-
ity Disability Insurane beneficiaries; the men produced a higher 
proportion of that income than did beneficiaries. 1 56 That incentives 
affect employment is strongly indicated by statistics establishing that 
in every category of severity of disablement married men had higher 
median earnings than non-married. 157 Disabled men are less likely to 
be employed full time if they are not married. 158 Recent data from 
the Netherlands, where disability insurance benefits are as much as 
eighty percent of former earnings, show disability rates over three and 
one half times those in the United States. 159 
Recent federally financed experiments designed to determine the effect 
of a negative income tax, give a measure of the disincentive effect from 
receipt of public income benefits. An analysis of the Seattle and Denver 
Income Maintenance Experiments indicated that a negative income tax 
support level at the poverty level produces as little as a 6.2% reduc-
tion in the hours worked by husbands and as little as a 22. 7% reduc-
152. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A) (1976). 
153. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-75 (1982). 
154. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2)(vi) (1982). 
155. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.223 (1982). 
156. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 23, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY 
OF THE DISABLED: I 966 17, table F (1973) [hereafter cited as SSSD REPORT No. 23). 
157. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 17, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY 
OF THE DISABLED: 1966 6-7 (1971). 
158. There are, however, indications to the contrary. A 1966 Social Security study of rehabilita-
tion of the disabled indicated that a slightly greater portion of those persons receiving income-
maintenance payments were also receiving rehabilitation services. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND 
STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
REPORT No. 12, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 1966 9-10 (1970). This 
may be partially explained by the facts that those receiving wage replacement benefits suffer 
more serious impairment, and that referrals from the social agencies administering the programs 
have been routinized. See id. at 5. 
159. See Miller, supra note 151, at 31, 43. 
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tion in the hours worked by wives} 60 Another study indicated that the 
long run effect of a negative income tax was a 7 .5% reduction in the 
hours of work of husbands and 15.4% reduction in the hours of work 
of wives. 161 A third study suggested that a negative income tax would 
produce a fifty percent reduction in the amount of work performed. 162 
The disagreement lies not in whether there is a disincentive, but in 
the strength of that disincentive. The disincentive of guaranteed in-
come probably produces different effects upon different portions of 
the working population. Those persons with physical or mental im-
pairments are more affected by guaranteed income than the general 
population. 
Victims of racial, religious, or national origins discrimination are 
probably not excused by family members from responsibility for pro-
ducing income simply because of the discrimination they experience. 
The same is probably now true of married women who are victims of 
discrimination. Although marriage is a factor which typically induces 
disabled men to return to the workforce, it is possible that spouses 
and children accept a physical or mental impairment as an excuse for 
not producing income, particularly if the lost earned income is partially 
replaced by disability insurance. 163 Indeed, receipt of disability payments 
may also prove that the recipient is unable to perform chores or pro-
vide other services in the household and therefore is entitled to assistance 
in personal care activities. 164 
A recent study of public policies toward the disabled suggests that 
there is a complex relationship between income-maintenance programs 
and disability, which includes the possibility that impaired persons are 
induced to leave the labor force and accept "disabled" status. 165 The 
160. See Keeley, Robins, Spiegelman & West, The Labor Effects and Costs of Alternative 
Negative Income Tax Programs, 13 J. HuM. RESOURCES 19, table 7 (1978). 
161. SRI INTERNATIONAL, A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSE To 
A NEGATIVE INCOME TAX PROGRAM: EVIDENCE FROM THE SEATTLE AND DENVER INCOME 
MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS 35, 43 (1978). 
162. See M. ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 28 (1978). But see Nicholson, Welfare Reform and the Negative Income Tax, 
32 STAN. L. REv. 453,460 (1980) (reviewing Anderson's Study, supra, and concluding that lower 
rates of withdrawal are to be expected). 
163. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 90-91 (discussing the need for additional studies on 
the relationship between familial statutes and disability). 
164. According to a 1966 Social Security Study, 40% of all disabled women needed help 
with housework, whereas 7011/o of the disability beneficiaries needed help with housework. Of 
retired beneficiaries only 3911/o needed help with housework. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT 
No. 21, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE DISABLED: 1966 3, 9 (1972). Family attitudes 
toward the possibility of rehabilitation are so important that it has been suggested that the entire 
family be tested as a unit early in a rehabilitation process. See Westin & Reiss, The Family's 
Role in Rehabilitation: Early Warning System, 45 J. REHABILITATION 26-29 (1979). 
165. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 141-43. See also Robins & Wai, Work Effort, 6 
J. INST. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDIES 53 (1981). 
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study suggests that this is most likely to be the case with an older im-
paired person whose prospects of employment are so diminished that 
the ratio of disability benefits to prospective wages renders the 
"disabled" status acceptable. 166 
Indeed, the law concerning Social Security Disability Insurance ac-
cepts as a working hypothesis the proposition that receipt of disability 
insurance benefits has a disincentive effect upon employment. 167 In a 
series of amendments to the statute regulating Social Security, Congress 
has attempted to minimize the disincentive of accepting employment 
at a cost of undergoing a new waiting period to re-establish eligibility. 
Recent amendments made in 1980 permit a person a trial work period 
of twenty-four months, in which benefits are not received while work-
ing during the last twelve months, but during which one becomes eligi-
ble for renewed benefits if no longer engaged in substantial gainful 
acitivity. 168 The same amendments eliminated the twenty-four month 
eligibility waiting period for Medicare for persons who again become 
eligible for disability insurance. 169 The Senate Finance Committee's 
report on the amendments reflected a conviction that the prospect of 
losing high disability benefits is a disincentive to a return to permanent 
self-support work. 110 
Thus, even though there are disincentives for the handicapped to return 
to employment, these disincentives do not necessarily prove that the 
discrimination model is an inappropriate way to improve their em-
ployment prospects. Such disincentives do, however, caution against 
expectations that laws prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped 
will result in productivity increases comparable to those that can be 
166. Medical commentators have also noted the tendency of disability benefits to perpetuate 
disability. See Mikkelson, The Psychology of Disability, 7 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 90/74, at 97/87 
(1977); Rivinus, The Abuse of Social Security Income, 7 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 85/69, 89/73 (1977); 
Wallis, Negative Incentives to Vocational Rehabilitation, 38 REHABILITATION LIT. 143 (1977); 
SSSD REPORT No. 23, supra note 156 at 17, table F (1973). 
167. The law establishing social security disability insurance originally required a six-month 
waiting period to establish disability. Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. 880, § 103, 
70 Stat. 807, 815. This discouraged employment that would result in loss of status as a beneficiary 
because it would require undergoing another six-month waiting period to re-establish beneficiary 
status. In 1960 Congress amended the law to permit a beneficiary to undertake a trial period 
of employment for as much as nine months without loss of qualification. Social Security Amend-
ments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-778, § 403a, 74 Stat. 924, 968-69 (1960). Previously, only persons 
in state approved rehabilitation programs were eligible for a trial work period. If the work ex-
perience indicated that the person could engage in substantial gainful activities, entitlement to 
benefits would terminate three months after that ability was demonstrated. Id. at 967. The same 
amendment added a provision making an individual eligible for disability insurance without a 
waiting period if substantial gainful activity became impossible within five years after disability 
payments terminated. Id. 
168. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 303(b)(l)(A), 
94 Stat. 441, 451 (1980). 
169. Id. § 103. See also H. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1980). 
170. S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1980). 
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expected from laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, or national origin. 
B. Resistance to a Discrimination Model for Improving 
Employment Opportunities for the Handicapped 
Although the matter does not permit precise measurement, considera-
tion of community standards and values suggests that an allegation 
of discrimination against the handicapped will be viewed as an allega-
tion of conduct even more contemptible than an allegation of discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. Those charged 
with the latter types of discrimination frequently may rationalize that 
their challenged conduct was only an unthinking continuation of prac-
tices adopted at a time when society did not find such conduct objec-
tionable. Their discrimination was not intentional and motivated. This 
rationalization will be available much less frequently with respect to 
discrimination against the handicapped. Employment opportunities will 
be denied the handicapped because an impairment has been noted, and 
the denial based upon the presence of that impairment. The denials 
will be intentional and motivated by the belief that such conduct was 
justified. 
Being charged with discrimination against the handicapped presents 
an obvious conflict with the typical and widely held views that Americans 
are kind, compassionate, and eager to help the unfortunate. One does 
not "kick a man when he is down," "steal from a blind man's cup," 
or "rub salt in a wound." This attitude probably accounts for ex-
perimental findings indicating a tendency of non-handicapped persons 
to give an unduly favorable or less critical initial appraisal to the per-
formance of assigned tasks by apparently handicapped individuals.i 11 
This general inclination to aid the handicapped could be destroyed by 
an anti-discrimination law, for one is less likely to be favorably disposed 
toward an individual whom one is forced to aid by law than an in-
dividual upon whom one choses to voluntarily confer a benefit. 112 
Because physical or mental handicaps are so frequently job-related, 
improving employment opportunities will depend in large part upon 
the willingness of employers to make accommodations for the handi-
capped. Some accommodations can be made, as noted above, at little 
expense. Others, however, will require expenditures which cannot be 
dismissed as de minimus. Experience with an accommodation require-
ment for religious discrimination does not provide a basis for a confi-
171. See supra note 42; see also Farina, Sherman & Allen, Role of Physical Abnormalities 
in Interpersonal Perception and Behavior, 13 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 590 (1968). 
172. See E. ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 217-22 (2d ed. 1972). 
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dent prediction that legally prescribed adjustments will readily be 
made. 174 Jobs will have to be restructured, work schedules changed, 
probationary periods extended, and rest periods provided. The experts 
in how this may be done are the managers of the businesses involved, 
not judges, lawyers, doctors, or even the handicapped. 
Attitudinal factors related to employing the handicapped will prob-
ably be of greater significance than they have been with race and sex 
discrimination. The psychiatric principle of cognitive dissonance may 
produce in managers charged with discrimination the conviction that 
the handicapped cannot perform the job satisfactorily or that accom-
modations cannot be made economically; the same principle could lead 
managers who have voluntarily hired the handicapped to conclude that 
they are equally productive as non-handicapped persons. 115 This concern 
is heightened when consideration is given to psychological experiments 
demonstrating that there are substantial barriers to frank and accurate 
communication between handicapped and non-handicapped persons. 176 
Of particular significance is a study indicating that non-handicapped 
persons significantly pref erred to work with a handicapped person who 
acknowledged his handicap than with a person who did not. 111 The 
person who makes a claim under a law prohibiting discrimination against 
the handicapped will, of course, acknowledge the existence of the han-
dicap, but he will assert that it is irrelevant to his employment. Thus, 
it is suggested that because handicaps are frequently job related, the 
effect of cognitive dissonance and cultural barriers will be much greater 
and more frequently prevent satisfactory job adjustment of charges 
173. Fear of damage to the relations between disabled persons and employers was the primary 
reason the British Manpower Services Commission did not adopt an anti-discrimination law to 
replace the unsatisfactory quota system established pursuant to the English Disabled Persons 
(Employment) Act of 1944. See BRITISH MANPOWER SERVICES COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE QUOTA 
SCHEME FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF DISABLED PEOPLE - A REPORT 16 (1981). See also infra text 
accompanying notes 194-96. 
174. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Maine Human 
Rights Comm'n v. Paperworkers Local 1361, 383 A.2d 369 (Me. 1978). 
175. See Aronson, supra note 172, at 89-139. The principle of cognitive dissonance assumes 
people try to maintain consistent views, or cognitions, about themselves and the world in which 
they live. A person experiences dissonance if his view of himself conflicts with the image he 
wishes to present to others; as a result, the individual will seek to avoid that dissonance either 
by changing his view of himself or his view of the world. See generally, L. FESTINGER, A THEORY 
OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). The argument runs that to avoid cognitive dissonance, an 
employer charged with discrimination by an employee will find it proper to refuse to employ 
the employee because the employer does not want to believe he is an evil person who would 
harm the handicapped. Similarly, under a cognitive dissonance theory, an employer will strive 
to hire a handicapped person voluntarily because it will suggest to others that the employer is 
a "good" and humane person. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46. 
177. See Hastorf, Widfogel & Cassman, Acknowledgement of Handicap as a Tactic in Social 
Interaction, 37 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1790 (1979). 
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of discrimination against the handicapped than has been the case with 
other forms of discrimination. 
Concerns of this sort led the authors of a study conducted for the 
Department of Labor to caution that stringent enforcement of Section 
503 of the Rehabilitation Act would change the climate of current at-
titudes, viewed as fairly favorable and sympathetic toward the disabled, 
and result in loss of good will and willingness to hire the handicapped. 178 
C. Cost Considerations 
Employer concerns that hiring the handicapped will result in substan-
tially increased costs for workers' compensation are largely misplaced. 119 
Handicapped workers have average or better safety records, and tend 
to be more careful than non-handicapped workers. Moreover, about 
three out of four employers in the United States have no basis for 
concern that their workers' compensation costs might be increased 
because of employment of the physically handicapped - the number 
of their employees is so small that they do not have premiums set by 
an experience rating. 180 Larger employers, however, have not been given 
adequate protection against injury costs related to handicaps because 
of the narrow coverage of second injury funds. 181 
As mentioned above, 182 employers - particularly those with a large 
number of employees - can accommodate the handicapped at a 
relatively insignificant cost. Yet, special devices for particular handicaps 
are expensive. In 1979, a talking calculator for a blind executive cost 
$300, and a hard copy machine to assist deaf employees in com-
municating telephonically cost $400 to $700. One corporation is reported 
to have purchased two high-speed braille computer printers for use 
by several blind computer programmers at a cost of $12,000 each. 183 
Thus, cost frequently will be an important factor in determining the 
extent to which employers make accomodations for many handicapped 
employees. 
The cost of medical and hospitalization insurance for employees will 
almost certainly be increased if employers are required to hire handi-
capped employees. 184 The 1966 Social Security Survey of the Disabled 
178. See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR 1 A STUDY OF 
AccoMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS, FINAL REPORT 
85-86, 98-99 (I 982). 
179. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
180. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 234, WORKMEN'S COM· 
PENSATION AND THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER 3 (1961). 
181. Id. at 66-67. 
182. See supra notes 20-21, and accompanying text. 
183. See REP. No. 316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1979). 
184. See Baker & Karol, Employee Insurance Benefit Plans and Discrimination on the Basis 
of Handicap, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 1013 (1978). 
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revealed that the medical care costs of disabled adults were almost twice 
as high as for the total adult population, and even fifty percent higher 
than for the general population aged sixty-five and older. 185 
Wisconsin courts have held that the increased costs of providing 
medical and hospital insurance for the handicapped do not excuse an 
employer from its obligations under the state's anti-discrimination law. 186 
Additionally, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 
in reporting on the proposed handicapped legislation in 1979, recom-
mended that employers be allowed to exclude pre-existing conditions 
from insurance plans only if they are justified on sound acturarial prin-
ciples and are of a limited duration. 181 The consequence of this exclusion, 
however, is that the costs of health care for handicapped persons fall 
upon the particular employer to which a handicapped person applies 
for work. This would appear, at least to many people, to be an unfair 
result, and it may be expected to increase resistance to the discrimina-
tion model for improving employment opportunities for the 
handicapped. 
V. ALTERNATIVES 
The appraisal offered is discouraging with respect to the potential 
use of a discrimination model to meet the problems of the handicapped 
in employment. Litigation of individual claims of right to employment 
will be too complicated, expensive, and time consuming. Indeed, a 
discrimination model probably would be counter-productive. Investi-
gation of alternatives is required. 
It is important to note at the outset, however, that the handicapped 
include a disproportionate number of the aged, the uneducated or poorly 
educated, persons lacking training and job experience, racial minorities, 
and women. 188 These handicapped will receive some assistance from 
the programs designed to improve the employment opportunities of 
those groups. 
In searching for alternatives it should be remembered that constitu-
tional barriers that prohibit favored treatment of racial minorities, 
women, or persons of certain national origins or religious conviction 189 
185. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T. 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 8, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF 
THE DISABLED: 1966 27, (1968). 
186. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 14 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (1976); Journal Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor, and Human 
Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (1976). · 
187. S. REP. 316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 16 (1979). 
188. See generally BERKOWITZ, supra note 19. 
189. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
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do not bar favored treatment of the handicapped. It is therefore possible 
to undertake programs to enhance employment opportunities for the 
handicapped which utilize incentives for employers to hire the handi-
capped. 
These incentives should not consist of relieving employers from their 
normal obligations to employees. There are now more than 3,800 "shel-
tered workshops" in which employees need not be paid the federal 
minimum wage. 190 Given the lack of alternative programs "sheltered 
workshops" currently perform a useful function. Yet, an overall ap-
praisal leads to the conclusion that the needs of the handicapped are 
not well served by providing substandard employment. 191 
To the contrary, employment prospects for the handicapped can be 
substantially increased by requiring employers to meet certain basic 
minimum standards which experience has shown can be established with-
out significant expense or burden. Since 1968 buildings owned or leased 
by the United States or financed in part by a grant or loan made by 
the United States have been required by statute to be constructed in 
a manner to ensure whenever possible that physically handicapped 
persons have ready access to, and use of, the building. 192 The statute 
contains a provision for waiver or modification of the standards. 193 
The experience accumulated under the statute with requests for waivers 
must by now be substantial, and should make it possible to state with 
considerable certainty the circumstances under which buildings can be 
constructed free of architectural barriers to the handicapped. This statute 
can be extended to the construction of all new buildings or facilities 
which will be used in interstate commerce. Alternatively, the re-
quirements could be imposed on all new buildings for use other than 
as private residences and on which a depreciation allowance is recognized 
for income tax purposes. 
Parking facilities for the handicapped are now common, but there 
is no reason not to make them mandatory for parking lots associated 
with buildings or facilities in which activities affecting interstate 
commerce are conducted. Common sense suggests that banks and other 
190. See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, SHELTERED WORKSHOP STUDY JO (1977). 
191. The average pay in sheltered workshops is 780Jo of the federal minimum wage, see id. 
at 4; employees are substantially underutilized, see id. at 5; clients move into rgular employment 
at a rate of only 120Jo per year, see id. at 6; and clients do not receive the fringe benefits usually 
provided to employees in competitive employment, see id. at 8. The most recent study of sheltered 
workshops indicates that 830Jo of employees are paid less than half the minimum wage because 
employees are able to take advantage of special certificates for exemption under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STRONGER FEDERAL EFFORTS NEEDED FOR PRO-
VIDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND ENFORCING LABOR STANDARDS IN SHELTERED WORKSHOPS 
16 (1981). 
192. The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-57 (Supp. IV 1980). 
193. 42 U.S.C. § 4156 (Supp. IV 1980). 
382 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:2 
commercial institutions could be required to provide platforms or lifts 
which would permit persons in wheelchairs to work as cashiers or 
customer service representatives. It also makes sense to require employers 
of more than a small number of office workers to have desks that 
are adaptable to persons in wheelchairs. 
The list of feasible but inexpensive means of increasing employment 
opportunities for the handicapped certainly could be lengthened. 
Employers should be urged to participate in evaluating studies designed 
to determine which requirements off er the most to the handicapped 
at the smallest cost. The requirements would not be imposed because 
a chance application for employment resulted in a denial which pro-
duced litigation and a substantial liability for back pay for failure to 
make accommodation. 
There is an alternative to establishing specified requirements to 
improve employment prospects for the handicapped. The matter of 
what adaptations are to be made could be left to the employers by 
imposing a general obligation that each employer of more than a min-
imum number of employees have in its employment a fixed percentage 
or quota of handicapped persons. Such a scheme has long been used 
in Great Britain under the Disabled Persons (Employment) Acts of 
1944 and 1958. 194 Under that statute, persons who believe themselves 
to be disabled may apply for registration of such. If registered, their 
employment is counted toward filling an employer's quota. Employers 
are subject to fines and penalties if they increase employment without 
maintaining the quota established, which currently is three percent for 
almost all businesses. 195 Employers are thus free to provide employ-
ment to the handicapped in any manner they choose. Great Britain's 
experience with this statute has not been an unqualified success, 
primarily because disabled persons have shown a reluctance to register. 196 
In recent years, however, similar quota systems have been adopted in 
West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. 191 
Employer fears that employment of the handicapped will increase 
costs should also be addressed. Perhaps the law providing Medicare 
could be amended to provide reimbursement to employers for increased 
costs of medical and hospitalization insurance incurred from hiring 
a handicapped person. Second injury funds could be established for 
194. 7 & 8 GEO 6, CH. IO., 9 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND §§ 24-26 (2nd ed. 1949). 
195. BRITISH MANPOWER SERVICES, COMMISSION, THE QUOTA SCHEME FOR THE EMPLOYMENT 
OF DISABLED PEOPLE 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as QUOTA SCHEME]. 
196. BRITISH MANPOWER SERVICES COMMISSION, A REVIEW OF THE QUOTA SCHEME FOR THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF DISABLED PEOPLE - A REPORT 6-8 (1981). In 1961 the rate of compliance among 
firms subject to the quota was 61.40/o. Id. By 1980 compliance had declined to 35. I 0/o. Id. In 
May, 1981, there were 103,800 unemployed disabled people who had not registered, whereas 
there were only 72,300 unemployed disabled persons who had registered. Id. at IO. 
197. See QUOTA SCHEME, supra note 195, at 28-31. 
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all workers' compensation systems to limit an employer's liability for 
injury of a handicapped worker to the loss which would have occurred 
absent the prior condition. Second injury funds should also be expanded 
to cover all disabilities, and not merely total disabilities. These funds 
should protect employers of the handicapped even if the prior condi-
tion was not caused by an industrial injury. 198 If state legislatures do 
not act on their own initiative, the threat of federal pre-emption can 
be used. 
Monetary incentives for employment of the handicapped might also 
be used. Indeed, they have already been established in a limited way 
by Section 51 of the Internal Revenue Code. 199 Currently, persons with 
physical or mental disabilities who are ref erred to an employer after 
receiving rehabilitative services are considered members of ''targeted 
groups." Employers are given a tax credit of fifty percent of the first 
$6,000 of wages paid to such an employee during his first year of 
employment and twenty-five percent of the first $6,000 paid to an 
employee of a targeted group during the second year of his employ-
ment. 200 
Given the general reluctance of the disabled to make use of 
rehabilitative services, 201 restricting employment incentives to those who 
have completed or are receiving rehabilitative services is probably un-
wise. For reasons previously discussed202 it would be wise to avoid a 
system which depended upon individual examinations and appraisals 
of the disabling effect for particular employments. An employer's self 
interest should be put to work in discovering how handicapped persons 
can most efficiently and effectively be employed in a particular business. 
To establish that an employee qualifies for periodic tax credits, an 
employer could institute a simple test requiring proof of a designated 
physical or mental impairment and a fixed period of unemployment 
after registering with an employment service. Employment of a person 
currently receiving Social Security Disability benefits could similarly 
entitle an employer to a periodic tax credit. The credits should be 
substantial and of a duration to ensure continued employment. As sug-
gested in the Department of Labor study of accommodation provided 
to handicapped employees by federal contractors, tax credits would 
also provide an incentive for employers to make those accommoda-
198. See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 59.31-.32 (1981). 
199. 26 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. IV 1980). 
200. Id. 
201. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY AoMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T. 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 12, FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY 
OF THE DISABLED: 1966 8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SSSD REPORT No. 12]. Only one in seven 
of the disabled persons surveyed expressed interest in obtaining rehabilitation services. Id. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 99-110. 
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tions which are expensive. 203 The loss of tax revenue would be justified 
by a general reduction in welfare and disability benefits. 
Changes should be made in the present Social Security Disability 
Insurance program to remove the disincentives that now discourage 
beneficiaries from seeking employment. Current regulations provide 
that earnings in excess of $300 per month indicate that a beneficiary 
is capable of substantial gainful activity and hence is ineligible for the 
benefits. 204 Yet, earnings of that amount produce an annual income 
of $3,600, which is below the poverty level. 205 Currently, a sixty-two 
year old person who had had average annual earnings of $10,000 is 
entitled to disability benefits of $535 per month. 206 It would be irra-
tional to give up those benefits for the purpose of returning to employ-
ment at $300 per month. The law and regulations should be changed 
to permit receipt of a declining portion of the disability benefits as 
earned income increases to an amount which makes it rational to seek 
employment. 
Rehabilitation programs are seldom used by the handicapped. 201 These 
programs need review and revitalization. As indicated at the hearings 
on the 1979 proposed handicapped legislation, modem technology has 
produced many devices that permit handicapped workers to perform 
jobs for which they previously would not have been qualified: visual 
magnifiers, hearing equipment for telephones, talking calculators, and 
light sensitive wands that allow blind persons to serve as telephone 
receptionists. 208 Government sponsored research to produce additional 
similar devices would pay for itself by reducing welfare and disability 
benefit payments or through the tax on income produced by persons 
who previously were not employed. 
Educational and training programs for the handicapped can do much 
to improve their employm~nt opportunities. As noted above, 209 lack 
of education and previous job experiences are major causes of the 
unemployment of handicapped persons. Specific job training programs 
for the handicapped should be established. Within a few years many 
203. See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 1 A STUDY OF 
ACCOMMODATION PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS, FINAL REPORT 
99-100 (1982). 
204. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2) (1982). 
205. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 445 (1980). The poverty level for a single male in 1979 was $3,855. Id. The poverty 
level for two persons under 65 was $4,878. Id .. 
206. See Robbins, & Wai, Disability Programs and Work Effort, 6 J. SOCIOECONOMIC STUDIES 
53, 61 (1981). 
207. The 1966 Social Security Survey of the Disabled found that only 17% of the disabled 
under the age of 45 received rehabilitation sevices, and that only seven percent of those over 
the age of 55 received rehabilitation services. See SSSD REPORT No. 12, supra note 201, at 4. 
208. See supra note 183. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59. 
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of those severely handicapped persons who have received education 
pursuant to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975210 
will become of employable age, and it will be possible to measure the 
effect of education upon the employment of the severely handicapped. 
It is also important to educate the public in general and employers 
in particular to the employability of handicapped persons. Misinfor-
mation and myths concerning the handicapped - such as those con-
cerning epileptics, persons with cancer, or persons with history of heart 
disease - must be dispelled. The government can profit from under-
taking such an educational program. 
CONCLUSION 
The employment problems facing the handicapped are serious. The 
alternatives to a statutory discrimination model suggested in this Article 
are not intended to offer exclusive or comprehensive remedies. Rather, 
they are designed merely to spark discussion and debate. The search 
for solutions, however, cannot yield successful results until courts and 
legislators come to appreciate the type of remedy that the situation 
calls for. It is clear that a statutory model prohibiting discrimination 
will not serve the best interests of the handicapped or of society in 
general. Once advocates of handicap legislation abandon attempts to 
apply the concept of discrimination to employment problems, reform 
efforts can be channeled in more profitable directions - ones that 
will provide positive reinforcement for employment of the handicapped. 
210. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976). See Note, Enforcing The Right to an Appropriate Education: 
The Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. I 103 (1979). 
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